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STERILIZING THE RETARDED:
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
POLICY ALTERNATIVES
RIcHARD K. SHERLOCKt
ROBERT D. SHERLoCI4
Although the eugenic justjcation for sterilization of the retarded has
long been discredited, sterilization itself has not. Court-ordered steril-
izations are still pe7formed, although they are now justfed by the per-
ceived harm caused to society by the presumed inability of a retarded
person to serve as aparent. The authors suggest that thisposition needs
rethinking, and they examine thejustqftcations offered in support of ster-
ilization in light of the recognition of procreation as a fundamental
right. Messrs. Sherlock conclude that some existing state sterilization
laws are inadequate to protect the rights of the retarded and present a
new procedural and substantive approach to the issue, which should
serve to protect both the retarded person and society's interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1973, Georgia Mae Downs was sterilized permanently
without her consent four days after the birth of her second child. Her steriliza-
tion was not performed in the austere surroundings of a state institution, nor
was she operated on by a government functionary. Her sterilization came at
the hands of a respected physician in a small hospital in a quiet, New England
town.
Georgia Downs had been a deaf mute since early childhood and never
developed strong mental abilities. Her intelligence quotient (I.Q.) registered
in the "borderline" range.' Fifteen months after the birth of her first child she
again became pregnant, prompting concern on the part of state welfare work-
ers. They were troubled by her lack of child care abilities and her seeming
inability to control her reproductive activity. They encouraged Mrs. Downs'
sister to seek appointment as her guardian, and the sister, acting as guardian,
gave consent for the sterilization. Today Georgia Downs works at a steady
t Assistant Professor of Human Values and Ethics, Center for the Health Sciences, Univer-
sity of Tennessee, Memphis; B.A., University of Utah, 1970, Ph.D., Harvard University, 1978.
t Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah; Adjunct Professor, University of Utah College of Law;
B.A., University of Utah, 1973; J.D., University of Utah, 1976.
1. Borderline I.Q.'s generally fall in the 68-84 range on the Stanford-Binet and Cattell tests
or in the 70-85 range on the Wechsler test, in which 100 is considered average. Persons with
borderline intelligence are not significantly impaired in adaptive behavior, meaning they can
communicate, hold jobs, assume responsibility, engage in some social activity and write simple
missives. See Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardation 18-20, 32-33 (H.
Grossman rev. ed. 1977).
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job, is married, cares for one of her children and is suing her sister, the physi-
dan, the hospital and the welfare workers for damages resulting from their
actions in having her sterilized.2
Four years earlier in Texas the parents and legal guardians of a thirty-
four-year-old retarded woman also had sought to have their daughter steril-
ized.3 The daughter, Daisy Levi, had an I.Q. of approximately 40. She could
not count past three, did not know the days of the week, could not tell time
and knew nothing of the consequences of sexual intercourse. She had already
borne one son, then age eleven, with an I.Q. similar to hers, who had been
removed from special education classes on the recommendation of the school
psychologist because the child was unable to benefit from them. Alternative
contraceptive measures had been tried for Daisy, but those that promised suc-
cess proved medically unacceptable. Her parents, wanting to care for their
daughter at home but unable to care for an unlimited number of grandchil-
dren, sought sterilization as the most effective means of dealing with a difficult
situation.4 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals eventually turned down their
request, holding that it lacked the power to authorize sterilization. 5
These two cases illustrate the confused, often contradictory positions of
law and public policy regarding the sterilization of the retarded. Several states
have antiquated, little-used laws allowing sterilization without the consent of
relatives or guardians upon the initiative of institutions. 6 In the absence of
specific statutory guidance, several state and federal courts have followed the
lead of Texas and have disclaimed jurisdiction to authorize sterilization. 7 In
addition, some courts have denied that the parent has the power to consent on
behalf of the child to be sterilized.8
This Article will attempt to provide comprehensive answers to the deli-
cate moral, constitutional and policy questions raised by the sterilization issue.
We will review the factual background, then analyze the constitutional ques-
tions involved, and finally develop the policy options available for implement-
ing a considered approach to the sterilization of the retarded. At each stage
2. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (court
held defendants not entitled to complete immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); court
reversed directed verdict in defendants' favor entered by district court and remanded cause for full
determination on the merits; no final disposition had been published as of this printing); Boston
Sunday Globe, Feb. 27, 1977, at Al.
3. Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (rex. Civ. App. 1969).
4. Id. at 393-94.
5. Id. at 394-95.
6. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-78r (West 1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5703
(1974); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-45-1 (1972); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35-36 (1976); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
43A, § 341 (1979); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-47-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-
1 (1978); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 8704 (1968); W. Va. Code § 27-16-1 (1980).
7. Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Guardianship of Kemp, 43
Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968); In re R.,
515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974). Contra Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (Indiana); Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
8. L. v. H., 163 Ind. App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976)
(minor child); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968) (adult child). Contra In re Grady, 85
N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (minor child); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989
(Sup. Ct. 1976) (adult child).
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we will work toward a comprehensive policy that meets standards of factual
soundness, legal and constitutional scrutiny, and the most exacting concern for
the rights of retarded persons. Clearly, the finality of sterilization9 must be
given considerable weight, but, just as clearly, any policy that does not allow
parental or guardian consent for sterilization in the most compelling cases is
inhumane and ultimately shortsighted. It is the goal of this Article to develop
a policy proposal in light of these two concerns.
A. Historical Background
Interest in sterilizing the retarded first emerged in America early in this
century. The development of surgical techniques permitting sterilization com-
bined readily with reigning beliefs concerning the genetic transmission of re-
tardation itself. The rediscovery of Mendelian genetics led to medical theories
postulating that many of the most perplexing forms of mental illness, includ-
ing mental retardation and even "habitual criminality," were inherited
through the simple Mendelian schema of dominant and recessive traits.10
The legislative response to these medical theories was straightforward and
predictable: if retardation was inherited, a sterilization program limited to the
relevant target groups would, over time, eliminate the problem of retarda-
tion." Beginning in Indiana in 1907, this simple logic spread until thirty
states eventually enacted such a sterilization program into law.' 2
Many of these early laws were grossly deficient from a constitutional
standpoint. Most applied only to institutionalized persons.' 3 Many failed to
provide for notice of a hearing and for the right to be represented at such a
hearing.' 4 Some failed to provide for any hearing at all, relying instead on the
discretionary judgment of the officers at a state institution. 5 Most of these
deficiencies were eventually recognized by courts, and after modification
many revised statutes have been upheld by a succession of courts.16 The prin-
9. Although reversibility of sterilization occasionally is a possibility, the success rates vary
widely from study to study and between methods of sterilization. For decision-making purposes,
it is best to consider the sterilization to be nonreversible; in other words, one should make a
decision to sterilize only if such action is appropriate if nonreversible. Sherlock & Sherlock, Vol-
untary Contraceptive Sterilization: The Case for Regulation, 1976 Utah L. Rev. 115, 116 & n.7.
10. M. Hailer, Eugenics 40-75 (1963). This book is the best general history of the subject.
11. The most comprehensive review of the early legislative history is J. Landman, Human
Sterilization 54-93 (1932); also useful are S. Davies, The Social Control of the Mentally Deficient
(1930), and H. Laughlin, Eugenical Sterilization in the United States (1922). An excellent survey
of the legal issues is O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 Geo. L.J. 20 (1956).
12. See J. Landman, supra note 11, at 54-93, for a presentation of the 30 states.
13. An equal protection argument was used to invalidate several state laws until the argu-
ment was rejected by the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See Haynes v.
Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918); Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85
NJ.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913); In re Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
14. See, e.g., Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd as moot, 242 U.S. 468 (1917);
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E.
638 (1933). Vermont's apparently little-used statute (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 8702 (1968)) seems to
be still deficient in this respect.
15. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19-569g (West 1977) (originally enacted as § 17-19) (re-
pealed 1979); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 46.12 (West 1957) (repealed 1977).
16. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,206-07 (1927); State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673,299 P. 668
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ciple that the police power of the state includes the power to sterilize some
retarded or mentally ill persons received the sanction of the Supreme Court in
192717 and has not been rejected since, although some state laws have been
struck down for procedural reasons.18
In thirteen states laws remain on the statute books. 19 They are often con-
fusing and poorly drafted, and several have not been revised in decades; 20
most have been little used.21 These laws provide for varying degrees of pro-
tection of both procedural and substantive rights of the retarded.22 Procedur-
ally, some of these statutes establish state boards to hear sterilization
petitions.3 Others provide recourse to the courts either directly24 or on appeal
from the orders of such a board.25 Substantively, the rationale for the laws
and the concomitant finding that must be made by either the court or the
board may be poorly stated or missing.26 Even in those instances where the
rationale is clearly stated, the statutes differ substantially. Some require a
finding that it would- be "best for society" if a given person did not bear or
beget children.27 A finding that the sterilization would be best for the candi-
(1931); State ex rel. Smith v. Schaffer, 126 Kan. 607, 270 P. 604 (1928); In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712,
157 N.W.2d 171 (1968) (four-to-three vote to declare statute unconstitutional, but Nebraska Con-
stitution requires five votes to invalidate statute), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970); In re
Clayton, 120 Neb. 680, 234 N.W. 630 (1931); Cook v. State, 9 Or. App. 224, 495 P.2d 768 (1972).
Many of these cases applied to persons found guilty of sex offenses. E.g., People v. Blakeship, 16
Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936).
17. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
18. E.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974); In re Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935); Brewer v. Valk, 203 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933); In re
Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942).
19. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 59-501 (1971); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-78q (West 1981); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5703 (1974); Ga. Code Ann. § 84-933 (1979); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-45-1
(1972); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-36 to -37 (1976 & Supp. 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, § 341
(1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 436.041 (1979); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-47-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Utah Code
Ann. § 64-10-1 (1978); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 8701 (1968); Va. Code § 54-325.11 (Supp. 1981); W.
Va. Code § 27-16-1 (1980).
20. E.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 41-45-1 (1972); Okla Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, § 341 (1979).
21. See M. Hailer, supra note 10, at 143.
22. Compare Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 8701-8704 (1968) (no hearing or consent required for
inmate of state institution) with Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-78p to -78y (West 1981) (mandating
hearing, guardian ad litem, cross-examination of witnesses; statutory definition of "best
interests").
23. Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5703 (1974); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-45-7 (1972); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, § 342 (1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 436.050 (1979); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-47-30 (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
24. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 59-501 (1971); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-78q (West 1981); Ga. Code
Ann. § 84-933 (1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35-36 (Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-1 (1978); Va.
Code § 54-325.11 (Supp. 1981); W. Va. Code § 27-16-6 (1980).
25. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-45-11 (1972); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, § 343 (1979); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 436.110 (1979); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-47-60 (Law Co-op. 1977).
26. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 59-501 (1971); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5703 (1974).
27. Laws containing this standard often give no guidance regarding how the "best interests of
society" are to be determined. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 41-45-1 (1972); Utah Code Ann. 64-
10-1 (1968); Va. Code § 32-424.1 (Supp. 1978); id. § 37.1-171.1 (Supp. 1975); W. Va. Code 1 27-
16-1 (Supp. 1976). In some statutes there are explicit or vague references to eugenic purposes. See
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, § 2461 (1964); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35-39 (Supp. 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 43A, §§ 341-342 (1971); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 8701 (Supp. 1968). Other laws expressly include
provisions allowing sterilization to those who cannot provide adequate parental care, indepen-
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date as well also may be required,28 or may even be sufficient in itself.29
The role of parents or guardians likewise differs substantially among the
various statutes. Many of the laws make no mention of the parent or guard-
ian. Several, however, do provide for the obtaining of consent from parents or
guardians as an integral part of the sterilization process.30 Nonetheless, this
consent comes only after the institutional staff has located an individual whom
they believe is an appropriate candidate for sterilization. Finally, in a few
states parents and the institutional staff are given parallel authority to present
candidates directly before a board or court.31
The general tenor and ethos of these laws no longer reflect contemporary
procedural rights nor do they reflect any current medical justification for ster-
ilization. The eugenic justifications originally articulated are now repudiated
by most medical experts and hardly would provide a compelling state inter-
est.32 The laws themselves provide little or no guidance concerning the factors
that must be taken into account in passing on a sterilization petition. Should
the welfare of.the family involved be considered? Must the individual be sex-
ually active already or only "likely to be active"? From a medical justification
standpoint, it must be noted that institutional personnel do not now seek steril-
ization as often as do parents, nor do parents or physicians seek sterilization as
a solution to problems of public welfare and racial decline. Instead, parents
and guardians seek sterilization as a solution to particularly trying and very
personal circumstances. These personal dilemmas confront not only parents
but also physicians, policy makers and courts.33
The need for a clear and comprehensive policy for dealing with these
parental requests is demonstrated further by recent judicial history. In the last
dently of any finding that the child would be genetically defective. See Ga. Code Ann. § 84-933
(1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35-39 (Supp. 1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 436.070 (1971).
28. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 41-45-1 (1972); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 8701 (Supp. 1968);
Va. Code § 32-424.1 (Supp. 1978); id. § 37.1-171.1 (Supp. 1975); W. Va. Code § 27-16-1 (Supp.
1976).
29. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-37, -39 (Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-1 (1968).
30. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, § 2461 (1964); N.D. Cent. Code § 25-04.1-01 (1970); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 436.100 (1971).
31. See Ga. Code Ann. § 84-933 (1975); Va. Code § 32-424.1 (Supp. 1978); W. Va. Code
§ 27-16-1 (Supp. 1976). In North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v.North Carolina, 420 F.
Supp. 451, 456 (M.D.N.C. 1976), the court found unconstitutional a provision giving a public
official the duty to institute sterilization proceedings when requested to by the next of kin or a
legal guardian, because under the provision "for any reason, or for no reason at all, he [the next of
kin or legal guardian] may require an otherwise responsible public servant to initiate the proce-
dure. This he may do without reference to any standard and without regard to the public interest
or the interest of the retarded person." In light of this decision, the constitutionality of the Virginia
statute is suspect. The Georgia and West Virginia laws may be distinguished because they require
the parent or guardian to set forth the basis for his opinion that the candidate should be sterilized,
by referring to the standards set forth in the statutes.
32. American Ass'n on Mental Deficiency (AAMD), Sterilization of Persons Who Are Men-
tally Retarded: Proposed Official Policy Statement of the American Association on Mental Defi-
ency, Mental Retardation, April 1974, at 59 (approved at Mental Retardation, August 1974, at
C-17); Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 Ohio St. L.J. 591 (1966);
Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded. A Problem or a Solution?, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 917 (1974).
33. See Perrin, Sands, Tinker, Dominquez, Dingle & Thomas, A Considered Approach to the
Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Youth, 130 Am. J. Diseases of Children 288, 289-90 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Perrin]. See also Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978).
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decade courts in six states have considered directly the question of parental or
guardian consent to sterilization. Five have reached the same general conclu-
sion: absent specific statutory authority, neither parents, guardians nor courts
have the power to authorize sterilization.34
The general reasoning behind these decisions reflects growing judicial
awareness of the right of individuals to control their own reproductive behav-
ior. In the wake of Griswold v. Connecticut,35 Eisenstadt v. BairnP6 and Roe v.
Wade,37 no longer can it be maintained that a general grant of authority to
parents and guardians to act for the "best interest" of the retardate includes
the power to sterilize.38 If procreative powers are constitutionally protected,
then actions that would destroy the capacity to exercise such powers must re-
ceive strict scrutiny on both procedural and substantive grounds:
The courts are not faced in this case with a prayer for a judg-
ment authorizing ordinary medical treatment, or radical surgery nec-
essary to preserve the life of a child; we are faced with a request for
sanction by the state of what no doubt is a routine operation which
would irreversibly deny to a human being a fundamental right, the
right to bear or beget a child. Jurisdiction of the juvenile court to
exercise the awesome power of denying that right may not be in-
ferred from the general language of the sections of the code to which
34. Kemp v. Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind.
App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d
579 (Ky. 1968); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969). But see In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295,378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup, Ct. 1976). In the
last case the court approved a sterilization petition from the mother of an adult daughter. The
basis for approval was the generalparenspatriae power of the court with respect to incompetent
persons, as New York had no statute authorizing sterilization of individuals. A similar rationale
was used in In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962), in which the judge relied on the
broad statutory authority given to probate courts over the feeble-minded to order the sterilization
of an adult retarded woman on the petition of her mother/guardian.
Several federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have had to address the line of reason-
ing advanced in Sallmaier and Simpson. In Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio
1971), motion for reconsideration denied, 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973), an action was
brought against a probate judge for ordering the plaintiff to submit to sterilization. The district
court refused the judge the shield of judicial immunity, because he had acted in absense of alljurisdiction: "Nor has this Court been able to discover any judicial precedent for such an order in
the absence of a specific statute." Id. at 674. However, in Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th
Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), the issue was again whether ajudge had acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction when he ordered sterilization of a child simply
upon the petition of a parent. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was no
statutory or common-law basis for the sterilization order, even though an Indiana statute con-
ferred broad and general jurisdiction in the state's circuit courts. Id. at 174-75. The Supreme Court
reversed, deciding that Indiana law vested in the judge "the power to entertain and act upon the
petition for sterilization." 435 U.S. at 364.
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute forbidding use of contraceptives by married persons declared
unconstitutional).
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute forbidding distribution of contraceptives to unmarried per-
sons found to be unconstitutional).
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declared unconstitutional a statute making abortion criminal with-
out regard to the stage of pregnancy).
38. On the development of the general idea of reproductive freedom, see Doss & Doss, On
Morals, Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. Miami L. Rev. 395 (1971); Note, On Privacy: Consti-
tutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 670 (1973).
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we have referred. Such jurisdiction may be conferred only by spe-
cific statute.
Whatever might be the merits of permanently depriving this
child of this right, the juvenile court may not do so without statutory
authority-authority which provides guidelines and adequate legal
safeguards determined by the people's elected representatives to be
necessary after full consideration of the constitutional rights of the
individual and the general welfare of the people.39
Despite the absence of specific statutory guidelines, there is continuing
evidence of physicians' accession to parental requests for sterilization. The
American Medical Association's handbook on retardation for primary-care
physicians specifically notes that parents of retarded children often will seek
advice on sterilization from pediatricians and family physicians.40 A recent
example of professional concern about this issue is the new, official policy
statement of the American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD), the
largest professional organization in the field. Its guidelines reflect a serious
attempt to balance the right of the retarded person to reproductive freedom
against the demonstrated need, in some cases, for sterilization.4 1
The absence of specific legal guidelines fosters abuse of the rights of the
retarded on the one hand and unwarranted hesitancy in cases of demonstrated
need on the other. Neither of these situations should be tolerated; both lead to
human suffering and to a diminished concern for the welfare of retarded
persons.
B. Justfcations
Early legislative efforts to provide for the sterilization of institutionalized
persons were based on eugenic theories that are now repudiated by most ex-
perts.42 Knowledge gained from the study of genetics and epidemiology has
39. In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467,470-71 (Mo. 1974). The issue on appeal was whether the
juvenile court had jurisdiction to order sterilization on petition from the mother. The court con-
cluded that it did not. Id. at 470. This same argument also was advanced by the Dep't of Health &
Human Services (DHHS) in suggesting regulations governing DHHS financing of sterilization in
family planning clinics or with federal funds. Originally, DHHS had permitted sterilization with
federal funds under certain guidelines, but DHHS has revised its regulations in light of Relf v.
Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), modifications rejected, 403 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C.
1975), dismissed as moot, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court found that Secretary of DHHS
lacked authority to fund the sterilization of any person incompetent under state law to consent to
such an operation). Federal financial participation in the sterilization of incompetent or institu-
tionalized persons now is prohibited. 42 C.F.R. § 441.254 (1980). The rationale follows that
noted in the state court decisions discussed in the text: sterilization is such a serious and irreversi-
ble measure that it cannot be presumed to be included in a general grant of authority from Con-
gress. Absent a clear legislative mandate to the contrary, sterilization must be assumed to be
excluded in the case of incompetent persons who cannot give legal consent for themselves.
40. American Med. Ass'n, Mental Retardation: A Handbook for the Primary Physician 56-
58 (3d ed. 1976); see also Perrin, supra note 33, at 289.
41. See AAMD, note 32 supra. In general the AAMD statement rejects any sterilization done
by the state on an involuntary basis and supports only those sterilizations of impaired or incompe-
tent persons performed with the consent of his next of kin or guardian after court approval also
has been obtained. Id. at 61.
42. See note 32 supra.
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demonstrated that the eugenic theories of racial and social decline that
animated concerns half a century ago were invalid. Furthermore, it is now
clear that, except for a few specific syndromes, no specific biological factor is
known to account for retardation;43 thus, sterilization as an instrument of so-
cial policy designed to eliminate retardation, while effective in some cases,
sweeps too broadly, as many retarded individuals would not pass their afflic-
tions on to offspring.
The earlier period of legislative and judicial activity also took place
before courts had enunciated clearly a constitutionally protected right to en-
gage in reproductive activity free from governmental intrusion or controls by
other parties.44 Nevertheless, the courts have not held that this right is so
absolute as to be placed beyond any reasonable legal regulation when it impli-
cates other, equally fundamental interests.
Procreation is held justifiably to be a fundamental right both in American
law45 and in most international human rights declarations and covenants. 46
Nonetheless, it is clear that no single right can be honored in the abstract,
divorced from the whole cluster of individual rights and social responsibilities
that protect human freedom, nourish human virtue and sustain the common
good of society.47 One right, such as procreation, cannot be isolated from the
matrix of compromise and adjustment that is an essential part of the public
policy of any society. Nor can the welfare and rights of the retarded person
always take precedence over the welfare and rights of his family. The funda-
mental right of procreation cannot be honored without considering the effect
of that right on the welfare of others who possess equally fundamental rights
and equally serious responsibilities.
Rights, therefore, must be understood both as fundamental claims of the
individual to be allowed the freedom or provided the resources to pursue cer-
tain ends, and as inherently limitable entitlements the exercise of which must
be constantly adjusted to avoid impinging on the rights of other persons. For
example, it might reasonably be claimed that the most pressing need of se-
verely retarded persons is to have their welfare looked after by competent,
caring persons, since the severely retarded cannot be expected to do that for
themselves. It seems abundantly clear, however, that fulfilling this need in
43. American Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5-6,
332 (3d ed. 1980).
44. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute providing for sterilization of cer-
tain habitual criminals violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
45. "We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man."
Id. at 541. See also note 38 supra.
46. "Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion,
have the right to marry and to found a family." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217(III), ESCOR Annex 5, at art. 16, 1 (1948).
47. This point has been amply discussed in the spate of legal commentary dealing with the
possible need to control rapid population growth through legal means. See Clark, Law as an
Instrument of Population Control, 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 179 (1968); Dileo, Directions and Dimen-
sions of Population Policy in the United States: Alternatives for Legal Reform, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 184
(1971); Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas, 41 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 529 (1972); Montgomery, The Population Explosion and United States Law, 22 Hastings L.
Rev. 629 (1971).
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instances such as that of Daisy Levi will be inconsistent with the exercise of
the individual's fundamental procreative right. The recognition that procrea-
tion is a fundamental right renders suspect all but the most compelling justifi-
cations for the exercise of the awesome power of sterilization. Nevertheless,
there are compelling societal and individual interests that can be furthered by
sterilization in some cases. It is to these that this analysis now must turn.
Although the eugenic justification for sterilization no longer is plausible,
new rationales for sterilization have been proposed by a number of profession-
als and policy makers. One of the most popular of these new rationales fo-
cuses on the harms suffered by society from the presumed inabilities of a
retarded person to function adequately as a parent. A few states even have
revised their statutes specifically to include this new "justification." The most
direct of these revisions is Oregon's "Sterilization for Social Protection" law,
which provides:
The investigation, findings and orders of the board . . . shall be
made with the purpose in view of avoiding the procreation of
children:
(a) Who would have an inherited tendency to mental retarda-
tion or mental illness; or
(b) Who would become neglected or dependent children as a
result of the parent's inability by reason of mental illness or
mental retardation to provide adequate care.48
This general policy must rest upon two fundamental assumptions: (1)
that some persons or groups will be harmed as a result of procreation by a
retarded person, and (2) that retardation can render a person substantially in-
adequate as a parent. Both assumptions need to be examined in light of the
constitutional status of procreation as a fundamental right and the correspond-
ing need for a compelling justification for irreparably terminating the capacity
to exercise this right.
There are several separate "foci of harm" that may justify a policy of
sterilizing retarded persons. The first and most obvious is potential harm to
society through procreation by individuals who are incapable of caring for
their offspring. This is the probable rationale of the Oregon statute noted
above. Careful analysis of the epidemiological data, however, strongly sug-
gests that this is an overly broad justification. First, the percentage of retarded
individuals in the population is extremely low. Dr. Tarjan and his associates
recently have argued that the prevalence is in the neighborhood of one per-
cent; even those who place the figure higher do not claim that it exceeds three
percent.49 The total retarded population is, therefore, not large enough to
warrant fears that society will be harmed significantly if retarded persons bear
children. Second, the known reproductive rate of retarded persons is signifi-
48. Or. Rev. Stat. § 436.070 (1979).
49. Tarjan, Wright, Eyman & Keeran, Natural History of Mental Retardation: Some Aspects
of Epidemiology, 77 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 369, 370 (1977). On the higher percentage figure,
see N. Robinson & H. Robinson, The Mentally Retarded Child 35-36 (2d ed. 1976); R. Heber,
Epidemiology of Mental Retardation 6-23 (1970).
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cantly below that of a control group of nonretarded individuals. Elizabeth
Reed notes:
Our data from 1016 families with I.Q. scores for both parents and
children showed a negative correlation of family size with both the
mean I.Q. of the children and of the parents. However, when the
tested non-reproducing siblings were included in the calculations the
order changed and the larger family sizes were found at higher I.Q.
levels .... It is not likely that the I.Q. of the general population is
declining because of the negative relation of family size and the
mean I.Q. of the children.50
This same result is consistent with other studies conducted in the United
States, England and Sweden.5'
A second focus of harm is that which might befall the retarded person
herself. There are cases in which the burdens of child care and anxieties asso-
ciated with having a reproductive capacity would have a serious adverse effect
on the retarded person.52 Consider for example the case of a mentally re-
tarded girl unable to maintain adequate menstrual hygiene habits. In such a
case, hysterectomy may alleviate the hygienic problem and provide permanent
reproductive control.53 It must be noted, however, that data on the child care
capacities of retarded persons make it questionable that concern about harm
to the retarded person is justified with respect to most retarded persons.54
50. Reed, Mental Retardation and Fertility, 18 Soc. Biology 542, 549 (1971).
51. See B. Farber, Mental Retardation: Its Social Context and Social Consequences 91-92
(1968); L. Penrose, The Biology of Mental Defect 57-58 (3d ed. 1962); E. Reed & S. Reed, Mental
Retardation: A Family Study 50-51, 64-68 (1965); Bajema, Estimation of the Direction and Inten-
sity of Natural Selection in Relation to Human Intelligence by Means of the Intrinsic Rate of
Natural Increase, 10 Eugenics Q. 175, 178, 184-85 (1963); BOdk, Fertility Trends in Some Types of
Mental Defects, 6 Eugenics Q. 113, 113-15 (1959).
52. This argument has been incorporated into state sterilization statutes that require a finding
of benefit to the candidate in addition to a eugenic basis for ordering sterilization before steriliza-
tion is permissible. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 8701 (1968). In Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 P.
921 (1929), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state's compulsory sterili-
zation law but rejected the pending petition for sterilization because the requirement of benefit to
the candidate had not been met. A newer Utah statute (Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-1 (1978)), how-
ever, requires benefit to the candidate or a eugenic reason for sterilization. See also In re Cavitt,
182 Neb. 712, 720, 157 N.W.2d 171, 176 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970).
53. Consider the following case recently reported in the medical literature:
A "14 year old" girl, the youngest of 10 children, was a premature baby with tri-
somy 21 Downs Syndrome complicated by pneumococcal meningitis when she was 5
months old, and severe myopia. She was known to the Comprehensive Care Program
from birth, and serial psychological testing showed an IQ of 30 with minimal speech
development.
At age 7 1/2, goiter was observed without hyperthyroidism, at age 10 thelarche, and
at 10 1/2, menarche with heavy flow. During menses she became frightened and with-
drawn, refusing to eat and going to bed or crawling under the bed. She did not under-
stand repeated explanation of menses by her mother, could not cope with menstrual
hygiene, and had to be kept home from school during menstrual periods.
The patient had total abdominal hysterectomy under general anesthesia without dif-
ficulty at age 11 .... In the three years after surgery, she was reported to have a happier
personality at home with no episodes of withdrawal, and she did not miss school There
was no history of sexual activity or molestation.
Perrin, supra note 33, at 289.
54. See J. Mattinson, Marriage and Mental Handicap 201-02 (1971); Mickleson, The Feeble-
minded Parent, 51 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 644, 653 (1947); Mickleson, Can Mentally Deficient
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While it may be difficult to imagine many cases in this category, instances
of harm in two other categories that may constitute a compelling justification
for sterilization are more readily apparent. A third category is harm to the
child resulting from parental inadequacies. Capacity for parenting is variable
in retarded persons, and little can be said beyond an intuitive generalization
that caring for more than one or two children is beyond the ability of retarded
persons. Many retarded persons have some degree of parental incapacity. In
these cases a clearly "compelling state interest" can be found in avoiding the
harms that a child born into such a household must suffer. This conclusion is
reinforced by the growth of knowledge about the relation between very early
development and subsequent cognitive abilities and skills.55 By the time child
neglect could be discovered and the child could be removed from the home,
permanent damage may have occurred.
A fourth justification for sterilization is exemplified by the case of Daisy
Levi.5 6 In such a case the burden and harms of procreation by the retardate
fall most heavily on the family. Retarded persons already are great burdens in
many families, and many families seek institutionalization of retarded off-
spring to free themselves from the responsibility of continuous care, even
though institutional personnel do not favor the placement of retardates in in-
stitutions in many cases, especially when they are of the opinion that institu-
tionalization may adversely affect the retarded person. Moreover, there are
families, such as Daisy Levi's, that are willing to care for their retarded chil-
dren at home but are unable to care for the added grandchildren that may
result without reproductive control. In these cases sterilization surely repre-
sents the least restrictive or onerous alternative from the family's viewpoint.
Furthermore, relieving these emotional and financial burdens may serve to
strengthen the already strained family unit.5 7
H. CoNsTIuTIONAL ISSUES
Buck v. Bell,"8 the landmark Supreme Court decision upholding the con-
stitutionality of sterilization, is now more than fifty years old, yet the constitu-
tional dimensions of the problem of sterilization of retarded persons remain
basically unclear, particularly in the recent climate of expanding constitutional
Parents Be Helped to Give Their Children Better Care?, 53 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 516, 532
(1949); Shaw & Wright, The Married Mental Defective, 278 Lancet 273, 274 (1960).
55. See Bradley & Caldwell, The Relation of Infant's Home Environments to Mental Test
Performance at Fifty-four Months, 47 Child Decv. 1172, 1173 (1976); de Chateau, Parent-Neonate
Interaction: Its Long-Term Effects in Early Experiences and Early Behavior 107, 110-12 (E.
Simell ed. 1980); Freeber & Payne, Parental Influence on Cognitive Development in Early Child-
hood, 38 Child Dev. 65, 66-68 (1967).
56. See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
57. Concerning the effects of a retarded child on the family, see F. Grossman, Brothers and
Sisters of Retarded Children (1972); Farber, Effects of a Severely Mentally Retarded Child on
Family Integration, 24-2 Monographs of the Soc'y for Res. in Child Dev. 1 (1959). On the stresses
leading to institutional placement, see N. Robinson & H. Robinson, supra note 49, at 413-31;
Downey, Parent's Reasons for Institutionalizing Severely Mentally Retarded Children, 6 J. Health
& Human Behavior 147 (1965).
58. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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rights. The decision in Buck occurred before the development of the current
"strict scrutiny/compelling interest" test for justifying the infringement of con-
stitutionally protected rights59 and correspondingly predates the recognition of
a constitutionally protected right of procreation.60 The decision also preceded
the development of "suspect classifications" and the application of strict scru-
tiny to the review of cases involving such classifications. 61 Furthermore, the
basis for much of the current legislation (that is, eugenic or epidemiological
theories of retardation) has been largely or totally discredited.
A. Parent/Guardian Rights
It is well settled under current law that parents have a fundamental right
to direct the care and activities of their children.62 The welfare of the family
and the protection of parental rights long have been recognized by courts as
worthy of legal protection. As a Washington court recently noted: "A funda-
mental premise on which our society is based is that the courts will zealously
guard the integrity of the parent-child relationship .... A parent's right to
the custody and control of his or her minor child will not be abridged except
for the most powerful reasons." 63 Consistent with this view, parents tradition-
ally are charged with the responsibility of providing for,6a and consenting to,65
medical care of their children.
There may exist a further presumption that parents will act in the best
interests of their children with respect to medical care, but any such presump-
tion is not irrebutable. In a number of cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, 66
courts have overridden parental refusal to consent to medically necessary ther-
apy for their minor child. These cases, however, involved situations in which
failure to obtain traditional medical treatment posed a threat to the life of the
child. When nonlifesaving benefits to the child have been involved, courts
have been widely divided on the question of the absolute discretionary power
of parents to seek appropriate medical care for their children. In cases in
which parental refusal was based on unorthodox views of a religious or quasi-
religious nature, courts have intervened against parental wishes, particularly
59. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
60. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
61. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
62. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
63. In re Welfare of May, 14 Wash. App. 765, 545 P.2d 25 (1976) (citations omitted).
64. E.g., Matthews v. Mississippi, 240 Miss. 189, 193, 126 So. 2d 245, 246 (1961) (parental
obligation to furnish medical care to child).
65. E.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, -, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (1972) (parental right to
consent to kidney transplant from one identical twin to the other).
66. People ex reL Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 IlM. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); Morrison v. State,
252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); Hoener v.
Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961); Santos v. Goldstein, 16 A.D.2d 755, 227
N.Y.S.2d 450 (1962); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962).
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when the expected benefits to the children were substantial.67 In cases in
which parental refusal was based on a substantial risk to the child or when the
procedure could be delayed until the child was old enough to decide for him-
self, courts generally have honored parental wishes.68
Thus, there appears to be clear precedent for courts to override parental
wishes with respect to medical care when those wishes (1) may harm the child
by depriving him of needed medical care, and (2) are based on uncommon
views concerning faith-healing or medically worthless alternative therapies.
Analogous considerations are relevant in many court-ordered sterilization pro-
ceedings. When no compelling case for sterilization has been presented, a par-
ent's desires for sterilization of the child may have needless irreparable
consequences to the child if acted upon. Furthermore, this parental request
for sterilization may be based on erroneous information and could be harmful
to the best interests of the child.
In light of the fundamental ramifications of sterilization, this Article will
propose a requirement of court authorization before a sterilization may be
performed on a retarded persons, even with parental consent. To reach this
conclusion, however, the question posed by petitioner in In re .K.R 69 must
be resolved: "Is this court prepared to single out sterilization from other medi-
cal and surgical procedures which parents daily consent to and obtain for the
benefit of their minor children. . . to second guess the best judgment of the
child's own mother... ?-70
The apparent answer to this question must be "yes." First, sterilization is
not analogous to most other medical procedures because it irreparably de-
prives a person of the capacity to exercise a fundamental right. Therefore, the
most closely analogous cases involve parental or guardian consent to withdraw
lifesaving therapy, because a fundamental right certainly is threatened imme-
diately. To date only two state supreme courts have dealt squarely with the
issue of parental consent and survival.7 1 Although the decisions in In re Quin-
lan72 and Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz 73 differ fac-
tually, they do converge in some respects. In both cases the courts held that
the decision to withdraw therapy should not rest entirely with an interested
third party and a physician. In these life-saving situations, the opportunities
67. See Sampson v. Taylor, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Carstairs, 115
N.Y.S.2d 314 (Faro. Ct. 1952); In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1941); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (rex. Civ. App. 1947).
68. In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (1911); In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553
(1952); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). For a full discussion of these issues,
see R. Veatch, Death, Dying, and the Biological Revolution 123-30 (1976); Note, Court Ordered
Non-Emergency Medical Care for Infants, 18 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 296 (1969).
69. 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974).
70. Id. at 469 (the court answered the question in the negative).
71. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
72. 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
73. 373 Mass. 728, 759, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (1977).
19821
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW V
for mistakes, for suspect motives and for misinformation are vastly increased.
In In re Quinlan the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote favorably of the estab-
lishment of a hospital ethics committee.74 In Saikewicz the Massachusetts
Supreme Court mandated court review of such cases:
We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and
awesome question-whether potentially life-prolonging treatment
should be withheld from a person incapable of making his own deci-
sion-as constituting a "gratuitous encroachment" on the domain of
medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life and death seem to
us to require the process of detached but passionate investigation and
decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of govern-
ment was created. Achieving this ideal is our reponsibility and that
of the lower court, and is not to be entrusted to any other group
purporting to represent the "morality and conscience of our society,"
no matter how highly motivated or impressively constituted. 75
Thus, both courts appear to approach the same end. When the depriva-
tion of a fundamental right is contemplated, the parent or guardian should not
have absolute power to render a decision. Parental consent is not totally irrel-
evant to the decision, however. For example, in Parham v. J ,76 the
Supreme Court recently upheld a Georgia law that provided for parental con-
sent to the institutionalization of a mentally disturbed minor. The Court held
that parental consent, when combined with institutional screening and an
evaluation by an independent medical representative, provided adequate safe-
guards for the minor's due process rights.77 The Court reasoned that this re-
view would be as likely to protect the best interests of the minor as would any
court review procedure:
Although we acknowledge the fallibility of medical and psychiatric
diagnosis, we do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of spe-
cialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained
specialist using the traditional tools of medical science to an un-
trained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type
hearing. Even after a hearing, the nonspecialist decisionmaker must
make a medical-psychiatric decision. Common human experience
and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an
adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical
decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emo-
tional illness may well be more illusory than real.78
This Supreme Court view appears to be relevant to our discussion. To
adopt the Court's argument and conclude from this that court review is neither
necessary nor desirable would seem reasonable. But, whatever its relevance to
institutionalization, the Parham rationale is inapplicable to the sterilization
74. 70 N.J. at 49-50, 355 A.2d at 668-69.
75. 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435 (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 44, 50, 355 A.2d
647, 665, 669 (1976)).
76. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
77. Id. at 607.
78. Id. at 609 (citations omitted).
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cases. First, a commitment order is inherently reversible, unlike sterilization.
Therefore, the need to protect the retardate's rights is greater than the need to
protect the rights of the institutionalized minor.
Second, while the Parham Court recognized that parents may act un-
wisely, the traditional assumption that parents act in the best interests of their
children should prevail nonetheless. The Court concluded, however, that pro-
tection of a child's rights and the nature of the commitment decision are such
that parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion.79 The
situation described in Parham, however, is so different from that which we are
considering that the relevancy of the Parham decision is greatly diminished.
In the case of institutionalization, the parent must present his child to an insti-
tutional review committee or group, and the institution can be charged with
the responsibility of providing a patient-advocate if the court demands. The
institution provides a permanent place to locate responsibility for meeting the
mandated review procedure. Furthermore, the Parham decision yields a
strong inference that the review personnel should be specialists in the relevant
fields of psychology, psychiatry and medicine.80 While review by experts may
not always be the case, it may be assumed that experts normally will be used.
Finally, many mechanisms exist for penalizing institutions that fail to meet the
review procedure, including a cut-off of state or federal funds.
In the case of sterilization, none of the above considerations is applicable.
First, the parent need not present his child to a specified individual or hospital
to be sterilized. If necessary, he can "shop around" for a physician willing to
perform what is in most cases a fairly routine procedure. Chances of finding a
cooperative doctor are substantial in most urban areas. Second, given the pri-
vate nature of the transaction and the limited capacities of the retardate, the
normal penalties for unjustified or negligent medical care (that is, malpractice
suits) are unlikely to provide a useful means of protecting the sterilization can-
didate's rights. Third, a physician competent to perform a sterilization need
not-and probably will not-know anything about retardation. It is unlikely
that he would be competent to review the factors that are essential to a deci-
sion to sterilize.
B. Due Process Considerations
At present, state statutes concerning sterilization of the mentally retarded
fall into two broad procedural categories. One type of statute, similar to that
in effect in Mississippi,8 ' provides for a nonjudicial review board to determine
the advisability of sterilization.8 2 Most of these statutes provide an appeal to
79. Id. at 604.
80. Id. at 607.
81. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1972).
82. For example, the Mississippi statute provides:
After the notice required ... shall have been so given, the board of trustees of
mental institutions ... shall proceed to hear and consider the said petition and the
evidence offered in support of and against the same.
Id. § 41-45-7.
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the judicial system if the board concludes that sterilization is proper.83 A few
of these statutes, however, allow the sterilization of institutionalized individu-
als solely upon the findings of boards of experts.and superintendents of institu-
tions, without any judicial approval or judicial review.84
The second broad category of state sterilization statutes includes those
providing for sterilization to be performed only following a judicial determi-
nation in the first instance. These statutes85 generally allow a court to utilize a
board of experts, a referee or independent experts to make recommendations,
but the board or individual experts do not pass upon the merits of the steriliza-
tion. Under these statutes the experts typically provide information to the trial
court of general jurisdiction, which, after a hearing with right of counsel for
the candidate, then makes a determination concerning sterilization. 86 Despite
the modem status of procreation as a fundamental right, the Supreme Court
has ruled that judges have immunity from suits for sterilization orders issued
without judicial participation in the decision to sterilize.8 7 This decision re-
versed a court of appeals ruling that because an Indiana judge's action in or-
dering sterilization of a fifteen-year-old girl without her knowledge had no
basis in law or equity, it was without jurisdiction, and therefore the judge was
without the protection of judicial immunity. 8
State sterilization statutes are in danger of running afoul of the clear
proposition that in the modem application of constitutional and administra-
tive law principles the deprivation of a fundamental right is not a power dele-
gable to a nonjudicial review board in the first instance.8 9 Indeed, under the
first category of state statutes that provide for a nonjudicial review board to
determine the advisability of sterilization, the procedural requirements do not
even meet minimum standards for administrative due process.90 Under mod-
em constitutional standards, therefore, the initial hearing should be made in a
court of competent jurisdiction. As a matter of course, any state statute should
provide that the nonconsensual sterilization of any retarded person, whether
institutionalized or noninstitutionalized, initially must be resolved by a court
rather than by a nonjudicial panel of any type.
The board of trustees of mental institutions may deny the prayer of the petition. If
the board shall find that the inmate is insane, idiotic, feeble-minded or epileptic, and by
the laws of heredity is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring
likewise atflicted ... and that the welfare of the inmate and of society will be promoted
by such sterilization, the said board may order the director to perform or to have per-
formed [the sterilization].
Id. § 41-45-9. This statute is typical of the category of state laws allowing boards of review to pass
first on petitions for sterilization.
83. See, e.g., id. § 41-45-11.
84. Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 5701 (1974).
85. E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35-42 (1976); W. Va. Code § 27-16-1 (1980).
86. E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35-43 (1976); W. Va. Code § 27-16-1 (1980).
87. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
88. Sparkman v. McFarland, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977).
89. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 724, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
90. See 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §§ 351, 353 (1962).
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C. Equal Protection
The most difficult constitutional issue to be resolved in any statutory ster-
ilization scheme relates to equal protection. The equal protection difficulties
turn upon two separate points: first, the distinction between institutionalized
and noninstitutionalized candidates, and second, the distinction between re-
tarded, potentially unfit parents and nonretarded, potentially unfit parents.
The resolution of these points likely will determine the constitutional validity
of any sterilization statute.
It is reasonably well established that the "right" involved in sterilization,
that is, the right to decide whether to reproduce, is a fundamental right of
constitutional dimension.9 1 As such, its abrogation, whether on behalf of a
retarded person or of a nonretarded person, would require a showing of a
compelling state interest in the sterilization. As recently stated in Ruby v.
Massey:92
What has been shown earlier in this opinion is more than ample
to demonstrate that the right of the plaintiffs children to be sterilized
is "fundamental" because it is rooted in the Constitution. ....
"Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
'compelling state interest'. . . and that legislative enactments must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155, 93 S. Ct. at 728. Furthermore,
"under the Equal Protection Clause" the means chosen by the State
• . [sic] must bear "a fair and substantial relation" to the object of the
legislation.93
Similarly, in In re M.K 94 the court stated:
The courts are not faced in this case with a prayer for judgment
authorizing ordinary medical treatment, or radical surgery necessary
to preserve the life of a child; we are faced with a request for sanction
by the state of what no doubt is a routine operation which would
irreversibly deny to a human being a fundamental right, the right to
bear or beget a child.95
In order to perform a sterilization on a mentally retarded candidate, the
state must demonstrate a compelling interest in the sterilization. As noted, this
interest formerly was found in the perceived need for eugenic control over
retardation in the population 96 and was based on the widespread but errone-
ous belief that most, if not all, forms of retardation are hereditary. More re-
cently this focus has shifted from the eugenic concepts implicit in the many
earlier sterilization laws to the state's proper interest in the welfare of minor
91. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); In re M.K.LR, 515 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Mo.
1974). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
92. 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978).
93. Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
94. 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974).
95. Id. at 470.
96. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
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children. It is urged that such an interest can be the basis of laws that seek to
prevent the birth of children to individuals who are incapable of providing
minimally adequate parental care. 97 These statutes, however, present a
number of substantial equal protection problems.
First, a medically demonstrable, compelling interest for nonconsensual
sterilization can be shown with respect to some individuals if consent is ob-
tained from a court of competent jurisdiction under the doctrine of substituted
judgment.98 As was shown earlier, there are at any given time a number of
extremely compelling arguments for sterilization of retarded candidates.99 As
will be shown later, there should exist a procedure by which such sterilizations
could be performed lawfullyY1°° Even in such instances, however, there exist
two substantial equal protection problems in any proposed statutory authori-
zation. The initial problem, which also must be subjected to a "compelling
interest" test, is the inherent equal protection problem in applying a steriliza-
tion statute only to institutionalized candidates. A number of current state
sterilization statutes specifically are applied only to institutionalized individu-
als.1° 1 These statutes generally provide that the director (or other responsible
individual) of a state-supported facility for the mentally retarded or "mentally
ill102 may petition the court for permission to perform a sterilization "in the
best interest of the. . . patient, or for the public good." 103 In order to deter-
mine the validity of sterilization statutes that explicitly apply a standard to
those patients who are institutionalized that differs from that applied to those
who are not institutionalized, an analysis must be made of the state interest
purportedly protected by the sterilization. Only if the state's interest in this
dual standard is found to be compelling can the statute be applied in a dis-
criminatory fashion between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized men-
tally retarded persons.1 4
Beginning with the earliest state sterilization statutes, their application to
institutionalized versus noninstitutionalized persons has been a matter for ju-
dicial concern. Many early cases held sterilization statutes unconstitutional
when the statutes involved applied only to institutionalized persons.' 05 In
97. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
98. For a discussion of the doctrine of substituted judgment, see Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 750-52, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31; In re Eichner,
108 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580, 595-96 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Robertson, Organ Donations by
Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 48 (1976).
99. See notes 48-57 and accompanying text supra.
100. See notes 126-87 and accompanying text infra.
101. DeL Code Ann. tit. 16, § 5701 (1975); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-45-1 (1981); S.C. Code Ann.§ 44-47-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-1 to -14 (1978).
102. The definitions of mental illness are wide and varied and may include psychoses, neuro-
ses and other personality disorders, including some disorders such as manic depression and schiz-
ophrenia, which are treatable with drugs. Mental illness also includes mental disorders which are
treatable through psychotherapy. The inclusion of "mental illness" itself raises, therefore, a seri-
ous possibility of abuse.
103. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35-36 (Supp. 198 1) (emphasis removed) (applies same standard to insti-
tutionalized as to noninstitutionalized retardates).
104. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
105. See note 13 supra.
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1927 the Supreme Court reached an inventive resolution of this problem in
Buck v. Bell.'0 6 Justice Holmes' opinion implied that the Virginia sterilization
statute, which clearly applied only to institutionalized persons, did not violate
the equal protection clause because Virginia was attempting to commit all its
retarded population to its institutions. 10 7 Therefore, all retarded persons in
Virginia eventually would come within the scope of the statute. This resolu-
tion of the problem, while inventive, is myopic and unrealistic and will not
pass muster under current constitutional scrutiny. As a first consideration, the
factual context has changed dramatically. States no longer seek to institution-
alize all retarded persons as a matter of course. Professional policy nationwide
now is geared toward finding appropriate community treatment and care for
as many retarded persons as possible, preferably in family homes, work
homes, or community centers.10 8
Second, under an equal protection analysis the reasons advanced for dis-
crimination in the application of state sterilization statutes between institution-
alized and noninstitutionalized candidates may no longer be found to be
compelling.' 0 9 Several reasons advanced for such discrimination have been
summarized in Ruby v. Massey:
The reasons advanced by the defendants in their brief to justify
the state for treating residents in its two institutions differently from
all other mentally incompetent children are:
"Once institutionalized the state is responsible for the care of
these individuals. To avoid problems of undesired pregnancy the
state may rationally decide to sterilize some individuals. State offi-
cials might otherwise be subjected to liability for improper supervi-
sion if an institutionalized woman were to become pregnant. Some of
the patients within the institution are wards of the state. Should one
give birth, the state would be burdened by the additional expense of
raising a child."" 0
It is clear, however, that none of these interests, although appropriate
matters of state concern, are sufficiently compelling to allow the state to apply
its sterilization statutes only to institutionalized persons. As the court con-
cluded in Ruby:
The interests which the state asserts may well justify it in establishing
a method for obtaining authority to perform sterilization operations
on its wards. The state is simply discharging a parental obligation.
None of those interests will be jeopardized if the same statutory pro-
cess is made available to those incompetent children who have not
been institutionalized. If the state may rationally decide to sterilize
some individuals to avoid incomprehensible pregnancy, it makes
shamefully limited sense to contend that the same right should be
106. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
107. See id. at 208.
108. N. Robinson & H. Robinson, supra note 49, at 24-25; W. Wolfensberger, The Principle of
Normalization in Human Services 106-12 (1972).
109. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978).
110. Id. at 368 (quoting Brief for Defendant (page cite unavailable)).
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denied to others in the same situation."'
This holding is sound, and any state law permitting sterilization of retarded
persons in compelling cases must be available to institutionalized and nonin-
stitutionalized candidates equally.
A second equal protection issue arises out of the justification for steriliza-
tion itself.112 The justification of sterilizing some retarded persons because
they are totally unable to provide care as parents raises central issues of under-
inclusiveness and suspect criteria. This equal protection issue can be illus-
trated by considering that (1) not all retarded persons will be unfit to provide
parental care, and (2) not all of those who will be so unfit are retarded. The
first point is not decisive; the second is decisive because it is a clear example of
an underinclusive classification that violates fundamental rights. Should soci-
ety not seek in principle to sterilize all persons who are unable to function as
parents? The constitutional and policy absurdities of this notion serve only to
highlight the problem. 13
To establish a rational sterilization policy, the specific harm that the state
is seeking to prevent-the birth of children to parents totally and permanently
unable or unwilling to provide for their children-must be kept at the center
of attention. In addition to sterilization, another path exists to prevent this
harm-the enforcement of criminal sanctions. Specifically, if an unfit parent
is competent to stand trial, he or she may be brought to account for failing to
care for his or her children through the application of state criminal-neglect
statutes." 4 Typically such statutes provide that certain broad categories of
conduct, such as placing a child in circumstances that produce a substantial
risk of death or injury to the child, or actions such as abandoning or failing to
pay court-ordered support, may be punished by criminal conviction ranging in
severity from minor misdemeanors through felonies." 5
These criminal penalties may be seen as parallel remedies to the steriliza-
tion of the retarded, since Anglo-American jurisprudence considers criminal
penalties to have not only retrospective but also prospective effect. Not only
does the criminal justice system serve to mete out social retribution for con-
duct beyond the pale of that which civilization will tolerate; it also seeks to
provide both general and specific deterrence to the commission of offenses. 116
Indeed, a principal concept of criminal jurisprudence is that by providing
criminal sanctions of sufficient severity to match the degree of social unac-
ceptability of the conduct, the actor will be deterred from the conduct in ques-
111. Id.
112. The proposals advanced in this Article will withstand, it is believed, a "compelling inter-
est" test, but only if the inability of the retarded person to provide adequate parental care is given
determinative status.
113. See, e.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 367-69 (D. Conn. 1978) (statute allowed
sterilization only for institutionalized individuals).
114. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3619 (1978); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-7-201 to -202 (1978).
115. See statutes cited in note 114 supra.
116. See, e.g., Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev.
949 (1966); 1 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 402 (J. Bowring ed. 1962).
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tion.117 Hence, it clearly is appropriate to view the potential application of
criminal sanction to certain conduct-in this case the failure to provide for or
care for one's children-in order to determine the propriety of utilizing other
measures to prevent the specific harm that the state is seeking to prevent.
When the applicability of these criminal sanctions is viewed with respect
to the retarded, two factors become clear. First, for many retarded persons
criminal law sanctions would be applicable and should be the sole instrument
of the state in preventing the demonstrable harm of child neglect. Second,
criminal sanctions should never be applicable to the most compelling cases of
retardation in which the degree of retardation is sufficient to render the indi-
vidual permanently incapable of standing trial (the individual would not un-
derstand the nature of the criminal proceedings against him and would be
incapable of aiding in his own defense). It must be concluded that the deter-
rent aspect of criminal jurisprudence will not be present in such cases and that
the social force of traditional criminal sanctions will be inapplicable. Hence,
the traditionally less restrictive alternative of criminal sanction is not available
to the state in dealing with many retarded individuals, and other alternatives
must be found.
This distinction between cases in which criminal sanctions can be effec-
tive and those in which they cannot be, provides a legal basis for sterilization
of the retarded candidate in a compelling case withouit requiring the state simi-
larly to sterilize nonretarded unfit parents on equal protection grounds. Fi-
nally, the analogous application of judicially recognized "incapacity to stand
trial" standards to the review of cases and candidates for sterilization will pro-
vide a greatly needed standard for identifying compelling cases for steriliza-
tion. This point will be developed later in this Article.
III. STANDARDS FOR COURT REVIEW
Because the candidate is presumed to be incompetent to give an informed
consent, there must be some general standard of review for the third-party
consent herein envisioned. We have identified three possibilities for such a
standard: the "reasonable person," the "substituted judgment" and the "best
interests" standard. Each has its own problems and strengths, and each re-
flects different areas of professional concern. Sometimes these three standards
are grouped as different versions of the doctrine of "substituted judgment," 11 8
but in this Article they are treated separately, preserving "substituted judg-
ment" as a separate standard.
A. The 'Reasonable Person" Standard
The current statement of the American Association on Mental Deficiency
(AAMD) suggests that courts use a version of the judicially recognized "rea-
117. Bentham, supra note 116, at 400-01. See also Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C.
285 (1930); Regina v. Wilson, 48 Crim. App. 329, 334-35 (1964).
118. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
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sonable person" test in sterilization decisions, based on the concept that preg-
nancy usually would not be intended by a competent person facing analogous
choices.' 19 This position is in conflict with other guidelines provided by the
same document, however, that seem to develop a "best interest" test along the
lines of traditional custody litigation. 120 These tests are not identical, particu-
larly in their application to difficult cases. For example, a determination of
what a reasonable person would do is difficult in cases involving certain spe-
cific retardation syndromes. In many cases there is only one chance in two or
three that a person will have a child with the defect. 121 Given that possibility,
what would a reasonable person choose? Many otherwise normal individuals
would decide-for themselves-to take the risk. However, if asked what they
would decide for the retarded individual, they might conclude, in light of
other disabilities of the person and his inability to provide child care, that
sterilization is bestfor her. The conclusion reached thus would be a determi-
nation of the "best interest" of the individual, not an assessment of what a
reasonable person would do.
The point in the above example is that what a reasonable person would
do is an abstract, highly speculative test that is difficult to apply in many situa-
tions because reasonable persons would differ over the course of action to fol-
low. Furthermore, speculation about what a reasonable person would do
avoids an evaluation of what is best for this individual.' 22
The reasonable person test does not account sufficiently for the reality
that a retarded person often is not reasonable. The test itself was devised for
an entirely different set of cases involving questions of tort liability, and later
was adapted to test the adequacy of consent documents signed by patients and
to determine the liabilities of the physician for failure to provide certain infor-
mation to the patient. Although application of this test may be proper in cases
in which an individual can be presumed to be "reasonable," such as in an
informed-consent decision,'2 in retardation cases no such presumption is
even remotely plausible. Moreover, since the patient cannot give an informed
consent, the physician must obtain authorization to act from someone else.
Thus, the reasonable person standard is inherently suspect because of its ab-
stractness and is inapplicable to retardation cases.
B. Substituted Judgment
Another test that might be applied in proxy consent cases is the tradi-
119. AAMD, supra note 32, at 61.
120. Id. (see also the Official Commentary).
121. N. Robinson & H. Robinson, supra note 49, at 77-106.
122. Problems with the definition of a "reasonable person" have been recognized in other
contexts as well. Justice Holmes, for example, argued that the "mental attributes" of the reason-
able man were judged by an external standard. 0. Holmes, The Common Law 108 (1909). Phys-
ical disabilities of the actor, however, were incorporated into the standard by which an actor's
performance was judged in negligence cases. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 32
(4th ed. 1971).
123. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Waltz
& Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628 (1970).
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tional doctrine of substituted judgment. This standard was developed in cases
involving disposition of estates of incompetent persons and asks the court to
"substitute itself as nearly as may be for the incompetent, and to act upon the
same motives and considerations as would have moved her."' 24 In essence the
court is asked to decide what this person, not a hypothetical "reasonable per-
son," would do in these circumstances.
The problems surrounding this standard in sterilization cases are similar
to those involved in the reasonable person test. The substituted judgment test
also has been borrowed from a completely unrelated set of cases. In determin-
ing whether a presently incompetent man is to provide monetary support for
his wife out of his estate, we have the man's previous life as a basis on which to
render an informed judgment. Did he support her before? Did he express a
written or verbal intention to do so? What kind of relationship did they have
during the period of his competency? These inquiries might yield reasonable
insights into this person's previous activities and into what he might do now
were he competent. Certainly such an evaluation may be little more than
guesswork, but just as surely some reasonable basis for informed speculation
might be revealed.
In retardation cases, however, there is no reasonable experience upon
which to draw, as the retarded adolescent being considered for sterilization is
young and never has been competent. Her past decisions most likely have
been spontaneous, reflecting desires of the moment or directions given by
those caring for her. To ask, therefore, what she would choose to do is unrea-
sonable and misleading. In the process of determining what the candidate
would choose, one would most likely be trying to discover what a "reasonable
person" would do. As previously noted, this latter test is inapposite to a deter-
mination of what should be done for this retarded individual, with her special
needs and problems.
C. The Best Interests Standard
Therefore, there must be another model, one that avoids misleading ap-
plications of standards that have been devised for very different cases. The
most promising alternative appears to be some version of the best interest test
that already is employed in the analogous field of child custody and support
litigation, in which the child legally and morally is in much the same status as
the retarded. This test has two merits that recommend it. First, it focuses on
the particular person affected by the decision and avoids the speculative con-
siderations inherent in a reasonable person test. Second, it is widely applied in
analogous cases such as custody decisions in which the affected individual is
not competent to decide for himself.
124. City Bank Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1944). See also In re duPont, 41 Del. Ch.
300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963); In re Brice's Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); State ex
rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. App. 154, 113 S.W.2d 143 (1938); In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241
N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962). For a complete review of cases and issues, see Robertson, supra
note 98.
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A best interests test is, by itself, rather vague 125 and consequently the dif-
ficult task of deciding what is in the best interests of the retardate has created
legal uncertainties. Nonetheless, the concept of best interests can be ade-
quately specified in a way to minimize possible abuses and avoid unreasonable
vagueness. To meet this goal, this Article will propose a comprehensive as-
sessment that should be undertaken in each case to determine whether the best
interests of the affected person can be furthered through sterilization.
There is one major threshold question that must be resolved before apply-
ing the best interests standard to cases involving sterilization of the retarded.
Because sterilization irreparably deprives a person of the capacity to exercise a
fundamental right, it must be determined whether it can ever be in a person's
interest to have that capacity destroyed. Even if there are some cases in which
sterilization is the least harmful action for a particular person, there still will
be a strong presumption against it. In this sense sterilization is dissimilar to
custody and support cases in which no a priori assumptions about best interest
seem reasonable and in which court orders are inherently modifiable.
There must be a reformulation of the best interests test to incorporate a
presumption that sterilization is a last resort to be used only in a particularly
difficult situation. Employment of this "best interests-last resort" test would
serve to keep in focus the magnitude of the decision to be made. It would
serve to highlight the crucial differences between sterilization cases and cus-
tody, support and care cases in which a best interests test usually is employed.
Finally, this test would require courts to be convinced that no reasonable alter-
natives exist to solve the problems of the retarded individual, her family or her
potential offspring.
It should be noted further that the best interests-last resort test focuses
attention on the difference between sterilization and other contraceptive meth-
ods. The generally articulated justifictions for sterilization, discussed earlier,
concerning the harms to the retarded person, her family and her potential off-
spring, can not in themselves justify sterilization over other means of prevent-
ing pregnancies. At most they demonstrate that it is justified to prevent
procreation by some retarded persons. These reasons say little about justifica-
tions for the sterilization choice; this difference is highlighted in a best inter-
ests-last resort standard in which courts could authorize sterilization only after
they were convinced that less drastic alternatives were not workable.
Though the best interests-last resort standard is acceptable as a general
framework within which to view sterilization decisions, there are five factors
that should be analyzed by courts in determining whether sterilization is
justified.
125. For criticism in the area of child welfare, see J. Goldstein, A. Freud & B. Solnit, Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child (1973).
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1. Certainty of Irremedial Condition of Incompetency Based on
Retardation
Although this factor may seem trivially obvious as a prerequisite to steril-
ization, previous cases and research demonstrate that such is not necessarily
the case. For example, in A.L. v. G.R.H ,126 an Indiana Court of Appeals
denied a petition for sterilization from a parent of a fifteen-year-old boy with
an I.Q. of eighty-three, which placed him in the "borderline" or "dull" cate-
gory. Two years previously he had registered an I.Q. of sixty-five, and experts
testified that further progress could be expected. Teachers at his special school
felt that he might eventually hold an entry level job in private industry. 127 It
seemed possible that this boy might one day be sufficiently competent to de-
cide for himself whether or not to be sterilized.128 His disabilities appeared to
be improvable.
This case may not be unique. Several researchers have demonstrated
wide fluctuations in the process by which individuals are labeled "re-
tarded." 129 The most consistent finding is the link between the use of school
performance as a process for identifying retarded children and the incidence
of reported retardation. 130 There is a marked increase in incidence of reported
retardation in any group of children as that group approaches school age, and
there is a marked decrease in reported retardation after the same group leaves
school.131
Those children with severe retardation are almost always noticed in the
community and are assisted by appropriate agencies whether or not they are in
school. However, a large number of persons are designated mildly retarded as
a result of poor performance in school, and once removed from that setting
they drift back into the community and seem to lead lives not much different
from those of many others who never were labeled retarded.
Unfortunately, however, the vicissitudes of the labeling process carry
enormous ramifications, particularly with regard to parental actions. Parents
often have greatly exaggerated fears regarding the developing sexual capaci-
ties of their adolescent children. In light of these fears, erroneous or mislead-
ing information concerning the child's abilities may become a basis for
exploring the possibility of sterilization. Moreover, what may be considered
"retarded" to an intellectually gifted parent may be different from what is con-
sidered "retarded" to a parent who has a borderline I.Q. or who was a "slow
learner" in school. It is not enough, therefore, simply to accept a parent's
testimony that the child is retarded and will never be competent to decide for
herself whether or not to be sterilized.
126. 163 Ind. App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975) (mental disability caused by auto accident, not
congenital defect).
127. Id. at -, 325 N.E.2d at 502.
128. Id.
129. B. Farber, supra note 51, at 43-68; R. Heber, supra note 49, at 3-36.
130. See J. Mercer, Labelling the Mentally Retarded 96-120 (1973).
131. Id. at 118-19.
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It is at the point of determining whether the candidate for sterilization can
become competent that the court should seek to apply the definitional stan-
dards suggested earlier concerning the scope of incompetency and degree of
retardation necessary to validate a court-ordered sterilization. Vital to the
granting of a sterilization petition must be a finding of incompetency tanta-
mount to a conclusion that the person is permanently incapable of standing
trial in any future child neglect prosecution. 132 This standard in fact parallels
the existing standard of at least one state statute 33 which provides that before
a court can "involuntarily" sterilize a retarded person, it must find the candi-
date unable to understand the nature and purpose of the operation and inca-
pable of rationally making a decision whether to consent to the sterilization.
Only in cases in which both aspects of the standard are met could the court
permit the sterilization. If the candidate can meet this minimal test of compe-
tency, the court must respect the candidate's decision, thereby leaving punish-
ment under the child neglect statute as a deterrent to procreation-the same
deterrent for others who would be competent to stand trial.
It also should be noted that this competency to stand trial test may be
substantially different from the standard to be applied judicially to determine
competency to engage in other acts, such as capacity to contract or to make a
will. Indeed, defining the test as the capacity to stand trial establishes a mini-
mum level of rationality necessary to assure that retarded persons with even
the most minimal capacity to participate rationally in making decisions con-
cerning their own status will have those decisions respected when the perma-
nent abrogation of fundamental rights is involved. Further, the application of
a judicial standard of competency based on a finding of permanent incapacity
to stand trial will be a necessary part of a determination that the sterilization
meets the best interests-last resort standard and that the traditional deterrents
to the procreation of neglected children--the criminal child-neglect statutes-
are not available to deter the procreation of children that will be neglected.
2. Capacity to Reproduce
It is well known that many forms of genetically based retardation are
associated with other disabilities such as reduced ambulation or motor control
problems. It is less well known that many mentally retarded persons also are
sterile. The most common genetic syndrome in this category is Downs' Syn-
drome, in which males always are sterile and females rarely are fertile.' 34
Whereas Downs' Syndrome usually is associated with moderate to severe re-
tardation, this is not always the case in other chromosomal syndromes associ-
ated with sterility. Several chromosomal disorders generally are not
associated with retardation, and when they are coupled with retardation it is
132. See notes 114-17 and accompanying text supra.
133. See Va. Code § 54-325.10(4) (Supp. 1981).
134. L. Holmes, H. Moser, S. Helldorsson, C. Mack, S. Pant & B. Matzilevich, Mental Retar-
dation: An Atlas of Diseases with Associated Abnormalities 150 (1972).
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typically in the mild or borderline category. 135 Hence, in many instances per-
sons who are both sterile and retarded because of these disorders will not be so
severely retarded that institutional care is needed. In these cases, the person
often will reside in the community, and parents, acting on misinformation and
fear, may seek sterilization. In such cases the sterilization is superfluous and
simply represents an unnecessary intrusion into the patient's body.
The necessity of evaluating the fertility of retarded persons before a deci-
sion to sterilize is made is increased by the fact that many mentally retarded
girls have delayed onset of puberty, especially in genetically based retardation.
Both sexual development in general and menarche in particular tend to occur
later in retarded girls.136 Sterilization is such a significant action, however,
that it should be a last resort for a clear and present problem, not for a hypo-
thetical problem that may surface years in the future.
3. Sexual Activity
The existence of a situation justifying sterilization depends on more than
a capacity for procreation. In addition, the retarded person must be suffi-
ciently sexually active to create a likelihood of pregnancy or paternity. The
need for a review of the retarded person's sexual activity is suggested by sev-
eral factors which tend to show that retarded persons do not engage in sexual
activity at normal levels.
First, among severely retarded individuals, sexual drives appear to be
lower than normal.137 This leads to significantly decreased sexual activity
among those at the lower end of the retardation spectrum. 138 Second, many
genetically based retardation syndromes are associated with other abnormali-
ties, often including physical deformities, that hinder heterosexual interaction
and make intercourse less likely.139 Furthermore, persons with severe or pro-
gressively developing handicaps may be cared for at home until adolescence
or young adulthood, at which time the family often seeks permanent institu-
tional placement. Under these circumstances the opportunities for sexual in-
tercourse are severely limited.
Finally it should be noted that even for mildly retarded persons without
significant handicaps (those capable of significant heterosexual activity), evi-
dence from one study suggests a markedly lower rate of actual sexual con-
135. Id. at 150-70.
136. Dooren & van Gelderan, Studies in Oligophrenia, I: Somato-Sexual Development in
Mentally Deficient Children, 52 Acta Paediatrica 557'(1963). The authors concluded that late
maturation "is usually associated with mental defect of genetic and prenatal origin," whereas
children with other deficiencies mature normally. Id. at 562.
137. Heald & Oberman, Perspectives on Mental Retardation in Adolescence, 174 Int'l Rec.
Med. 224, 228 (1961); Meyerowitz, Sex and the Mentally Retarded, 5 Medical Aspects of Human
Sexuality, November 1971, at 95, 96; Mosier, Grossman & Dingman, Secondary Sex Development
in Mentally Deficient Individuals, 33 Child Dev. 273, 283-85 (1962).
138. Heald & Oberman, supra note 137, at 228; Meyerowitz, supra note 137, at 104.
139. Meyerowitz, supra note 137, at 104. In addition, "retardates may find themselves repudi-
ated by peers due to the general gregarious cliquing of adolescents." Id.
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tact.14° Data from the Institute for Sex Research at Indiana University
demonstrate that in a group of moderately and mildly retarded persons there
was a significantly lower incidence of premarital petting and coitus and a
lower capacity to be aroused by sexual stimuli.
14 1
These facts lend support to the conclusions of the court in North Carolina
Alssociation for Retarded Citizens v. North Carolina.142 In upholding the con-
stitutionality of the main provisions of a North Carolina sterilization statute,
the court held the statute not unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary since it
specifically limited its application to those retarded persons "likely to bear a
child" who would be either 1) retarded himself or 2) neglected by the parent
because of the parent's retardation.' 43 However, the court held the specific
application of the law to those "likely to bear a child" necessitated a court
finding that the person was likely to engage in sexual activity before steriliza-
tion could be ordered. 1'
Although the court's holding does move in the right direction, it is too
vague in one crucial respect. The court held that petitioner must demonstrate
a likelihood that the candidate "will likely be" sexually active. 145 This re-
quirement is an invitation to abuse, especially when parents and guardians are
involved in the decision to initiate the action,146 because the statement that a
person "will be" sexually active is much different from a statement that a per-
son "is now" sexually active. The former is a mere projection of the future,
the latter requires a much greater degree of precision in determining presently
existing facts. Other courts have used some form of a "likely to be sexually
active" standard.' 47
A demonstration should be required that the retarded person is sexually
active to a degree sufficient to render procreation likely in the near future. It
must be shown that procreation is now at risk, not that the retarded person
once had intercourse or may potentially have intercourse in the future. The
purpose of the drastic step of sterilization is to eliminate the possibility of a
140. Gebhard, Sexual Behavior of the Mentally Retarded 29 (de ]a Cruz & ]a Veck cds. 1973).
In contrast to a control group, the retarded sample (consisting of 84 males) had 20% fewer persons
involved in premarital coitus, id. at 37, and 40% who had no sexual arousal when presented with
several different sexual stimuli, id. at 44. Results varied widely, depending on age of person and
length of institutionalization. For example, from puberty to age 15, the retarded population had
17% more premarital coitus than did the control group. Id. at 37. Marital coitus was similar in
both groups, but only 25% of the retarded sample had ever been married. Id. at 40.
141. Id. at 36-38, 44-46.
142. 420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
143. Id. at 457.
144. Id.
145. The court, however, added that "the judge must find that the subject is likely to engage in
sexual activity without utilizing contraceptive devices." Id. at 456.
146. When confronted with this problem, the court in North Carolina 4ssociationfor Retarded
Children severed from the statute the authority for next of kin or legal guardians to initiate sterili-
zation proceedings. Holding this section of the statute unconstitutional, the court described it as
"an arbitrary and capricious delegation of unbridled power." Id.
147. In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 795, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1976). See also Cook v.
State, 9 Or. App. 224, 495 P.2d 768 (1972).
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near-term event that would have severe adverse repercussions for the person,
his family and his child.
4. Unworkability of Other Contraceptive Alternatives
The cornerstone of a last resort showing is a demonstration that alterna-
tive means of contraception will not work. This requirement was implied in
much of the early legislative activity in the laws which specified that a state
board could authorize sterilization in cases in which a candidate would likely
produce a retarded child. 4 8 In practice, however, courts rarely tested such
provisions and state boards seemed not to have concerned themselves with
contraceptive alternatives. This may have been due partially to the prevailing
opinion about the limited capacities of the retarded to administer contracep-
tive devices. It also should be noted that until the 1960s, alternatives to sterili-
zation that were likely to be effective required a high degree of awareness and
self control: condoms, diaphragms, spermicides, and the rhythm method. In
the last two decades, however, newer forms of contraception have been devel-
oped that do not require as much capacity for self care and self control. Sig-
nificantly, these newer methods (modern intrauterine devices (l.U.D.'s), birth
control pills, injectables) approach sterilization in effectiveness. 149 Thus, it be-
comes imperative for a court to determine that these methods have been ana-
lyzed and are unworkable before ordering sterilization.
The most significant of these alternatives for use in retarded persons is the
injectable progestagin Depo Provera. This agent can be injected at ninety-day
intervals and produces both contraception and an absence of menstruation for
the interval. This double effect may make it particularly useful in retarded
girls for whom menstrual hygiene is sometimes as much of a problem as con-
traception. Once the drug has dissipated, menstruation and capacity for preg-
nancy will return after a prolonged interval. The medical literature strongly
supports the use of Depo Provera as a contraceptive in patients who for a
variety of reasons may not be able to use alternative means of contraception
reliably but who do not wish to be permanently sterilized.' 50 In much of the
world the drug is widely used for contraceptive purposes, and studies done in
various countries confirm its effectiveness and general safety.' 5 ' In the United
148. See J. Landman, note 11 supra.
149. Edwards & Hakanson, Changing Status of Tubal Sterilization, 115 Am. . Obstet. & Gyn.
347 (1973) (failure rate of 17%; citing to other studies having failure rates between .1% and 3.0%
depending on the study and the type of operation); Ferber, Tietze & Lewitt, Men with Vasecto-
mies, 29 Psychosomatic Med. 354 (1967) (4.3% failure rate determined by postoperative pregnancy
three to fourteen months after surgery); Garb, A Review of Tubal Sterilization Failures, 12 Ob-
stet. & Gyn. Survey 291 (1957) (failure rates between .04% and 2.89% depending on the study and
the type of operation). See also Pots & Swyer, Effectiveness and Risks of Birth Control Methods,
26 Brit. Med. Bull. 26 (1970) (comparing sterilization with most other common contraceptive
techniques).
150. Gardner & Mishell, Analysis of Bleeding Patterns and Resumption of Fertility Following
Discontinuance of Long Acting Injectable Contraceptive, 21 Fertility & Sterility 286 (1970);
Smith, Depo Provera (Injectable Contraceptive)-A Review, 23 Scot. Med. J. 223 (1978); Tyler,
Levin, Elliot & Dolman, Present Status of Injectable Contraceptives: Results of Seven Year Study,
21 Fertility & Sterility 469 (1970).
15i. Smith, supra note 150, at 225-26.
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States, however, the Food and Drug Administration now refuses to grant per-
mission for its general use as a contraceptive, although the FDA had earlier
permitted its use for a limited target population. 152
There are side effects with Depo Provera that make its continued use in-
advisable for some patients. One side effect is the possibility of great disrup-
tion of the menstrual cycle and failure to fully inhibit menstruation.1 53 In
many cases, however, this drug could be used as a less drastic alternative to
sterilization.
5. Sterilization as a Less Harmful Alternative to Reproduction
Even though the impact of pregnancy or childbirth on the family of a
retarded person must be considered, the deprivation of rights involved in ster-
ilization is a deprivation for the retarded person, not for others. Her welfare,
therefore, must always be the primary consideration in a sterilization decision.
In deciding to sterilize a particular retarded person, a court must assess very
carefully whether sterilization will affect the candidate in a severely adverse
manner.
Clinical evidence indicates that for some persons sterilization is a psycho-
logically traumatic experience that produces detrimental reactions. 1 4 From
studies of those who have had severe psychological reactions to sterilization,
two fairly constant contraindications to the procedure have emerged and are
stressed by physicians: (1) pressure by others (particularly a spouse) for sterili-
zation, and (2) preexisting emotional disturbance, particularly involving
psychosexual functioning. 155 Both of these are relevant to the case of the re-
tarded individual.
The first contraindication is fairly obvious in its application to the re-
tarded. Mildly retarded persons may be opposed to sterilization, but negative
opinions from others may make them feel pressured into accepting it. Sterili-
zation of these individuals could lead to serious emotional reactions far more
severe than any additional burden of pregnancy. The second contraindica-
tion, although not as obvious, is no less real. Its relevance for retardation cases
comes from the positive correlation between retardation and emotional distur-
152. 43 Fed. Reg. 28,555, 28,556 (1978). The FDA rationale for its action has come under
strenuous criticism, based on questionable evidence for the ban and the supposedly political na-
ture of the action. Congressional or public pressure is difficult to document. One study showing
that high doses of Depo Provera caused cancer in dogs does not appear to be applicable to human
beings, since the cancer appeared in types of cells not found in the human body. Smith, supra note
150, at 224-25. Furthermore, in the 60 countries where the drug is widely used as a contraceptive,
no evidence of increased cancer risk has appeared after a decade of widespread use. Id. at 225-26.
To the extent that the FDA ban continues it merely forces many parents, guardians and profes-
sionals to consider sterilizing the retarded when they otherwise may not do so.
153. Gardner & Mishell, note 150 supra; Tyler, Levin, Elliot & Dolman, note 150 supra.
154. Barlow, Pseudocyesis and Psychiatric Sequale of Sterilization, 11 Archives Gen. Psychia-
try 571 (1964); Doty, Emotional Aspects of a Vasectomy, 10 J. Reproduc. Med. 156 (1973); Rod-
gers, Ziegler, Altrochi & Levy, A Longitudinal Study of the Psycho-Social Effects of Vasectomy,
27 J. Marriage & Family 59 (1965); Ziegler, Rodgers & Kriegsman, Effect of Vasectomy on Psy-
chological Functioning, 28 Psychosomatic Med. 50 (1966).
155. Doty, supra note 154, at 158, 160.
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bance. This relationship is recognized universally by retardation experts, al-
though they may disagree about the causal relationships involved and about
the number of retarded persons who are emotionally disturbed. 156 A retarded
individual with such a pre-existing emotional disturbance could be adversely
affected by sterilization.
Thus, it must be concluded that a careful evaluation of the psychological
state of the retarded person must be undertaken as part of the consideration of
a sterilization petition. After such an evaluation, it would become a matter for
the court's judgment whether the sterilization would so adversely affect the
retarded person as to outweigh the possible benefits that will accrue to her.
The preexisting emotional state of a given candidate for sterilization may sug-
gest that sterilization would only lower an already precarious self-image and
increase sexual fears and frustrations.1 57 Such a result might be far more det-
rimental to growth and development, which should be one of the primary con-
cerns in the sterilization of any mentally retarded person, than would be the
possible damage caused by denying sterilization.
IV. THE ROLE OF PARENTS, GUARDIANS AND INSTITUTIONS
As noted earlier, statutory law in most states deals with the power of par-
ents and guardians in a very ambiguous manner, and the limited case law is of
relatively late origin. It has been argued recently, however, that parents
should be the primary decision makers for incompetent retarded children,
with minimal review by the courts. I58 The law, it is argued, should respect
parental decision making in this instance if the parent's decision is substanti-
ated by the codification of at least two experts that the child is in fact
retarded.15 9
Arguments offered in support of parental decision making are weak and
ill-conceived. In all these arguments the crucial assumption must be that par-
ents possess a privileged knowledge of the details of their children's lives and
the family situation that enables them to judge what is optimal.1 60 While this
may be true in some sense, it is insufficient to justify granting parents absolute,
discretionary power in the matter. Knowing the situation most intimately is
not the same thing as having the most comprehensive or objective view of
what the right course of action should be. Intimacy breeds both knowledge
and a distortion of knowledge. The very fact that parents are so drastically
affected means that their motives will not always mesh with the needs and
156. N. Robinson & H. Robinson, supra note 49, at 196-210; Menolascino, Emotional Distur-
bance and Mental Retardation, 70 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 248 (1965).
157. See Erickson, The Psychological Significance of Vasectomy, in Abortion in America 57,
85 (H. Rosen ed. 1954). See also medical cases noted in Johnson, The Psychological Effects of
Vasectomy, 121 Am. J. Psychiatry 482, 482-84 (1964).
158. Green & Paul, Parenthood and the Mentally Retarded, 24 U. Toronto L.J. 117, 123-24
(1974).
159. Id. at 124.
160. See, e.g., Green & Paul, supra note 158.
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA LW REVIEW
desires of the retarded child. It cannot be said, therefore, that they are inher-
ently in the optimal position to know what is best for the retarded person.
As a corollary to the parental knowledge argument, the claim is made that
the parents will be most directly affected by a resolution of the case, and that
therefore they should have the primary role in deciding the outcome. This
corollary is hardly accurate, since in most instances the candidate herself is
affected even more drastically.
Furthermore, the argument advanced in favor of great deference to a par-
ent's decision to seek sterilization for his or her child--that parents may have
legitimate reasons that justify sterilization but which would not be convincing
to the courts-is both dangerous and erroneous. 16' If a parent has adequate
reasons that reflect a sound evaluation of the situation of the candidate, then
those reasons ought to be convincing to a reasonable third party. Insofar as
parental justifications would be inadequate to a third party, they may reflect
only the fears of the parent or an incomplete knowledge of the child's specific
disabilities. Unchecked parental discretion in these cases "grants the retarded
person's next of kin or legal guardian the power of a tyrant. . . .We think
such confidence in all next of kin and all legal guardians is misplaced."' 162
If unscrutinized parental authority is an unreasonable approach, an alter-
native must be found that provides for a comprehensive review of a parental
petition for sterilization. Historically, numerous models for such a review
have been generated, and several have been enacted into law. Many of the
early involuntary sterilization laws created state administrative boards to act
on petitions from wardens and directors of state facilities for the retarded.163
Some of these laws did not for provide recourse from the board's decision to
161. Judicial intervention is an unnecessary invasion of a family's privacy .... Ifjudi-
cial intervention would be useful, the embarrassment to the family would be a minor
issue. But we are unable to see how it could be useful. The judicial process in this
context would work in a vacuum. In custody cases the best interests of the child test
could be given content by courts and commentators; for the problem with which we are
concerned it is impossible to formulate relevant factors to help guide decisions. A lay-
man, asked to decide several custody cases, will probably refer to factors that the law
considers relevant. What factors could be considered relevant in deciding whether steril-
ization of a retarded child is in that child's interests? Would any parent who sought
sterilization for his retarded child be able to prove that it was in that child's best
interests?
Green & Paul, supra note 158, at 123-24.
There is, however, a considerable body of clinical data suggesting that parents of retarded
children frequently may have erroneous information about sterilization of the retarded, that they
do have great fears regarding the developing sexuality of their retarded adolescents, and that they
may be overly ready to seek sterilization. Bass, in Attitudes of Parents of Retarded Children
Toward Voluntary Sterilization, 14 Eugenics Q. 45, 49-50 (1967), found that more than one-third
of her sample of parents mistakenly thought sterilization was castration. Hammar and his associ-
ates have found significant fears centered on the developing sexuality of the retarded adolescent.
Hammar, Wright, & Jensen, Sex Education for the Retarded Adolescent, 66 Clin. Pediatrics 621(1967); Hammar & Bernard, The Mentally Retarded Adolescent, 38 Pediatrics 845, 846 (1966).
Finally, the dangers of too ready an acceptance of sterilization are pointed up by the comments of
sterilized, mentally retarded persons themselves. See Sabagh & Edgerton, Sterilized Mental De-
fectives Look at Sterilization, 9 Eugenics Q. 213 (1962).
162. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 920 F. Supp. 451, 456(M.D.N.C. 1976).
163. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
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the courts. 164 However, if the boards acted in accord with minimal due pro-
cess procedures such as notice of a hearing and right to cross-examine wit-
nesses, their use was held to be a permissible method of making decisions in
this field.165
Another alternative for comprehensive review of parental petitions for
sterilization is illustrated by an Arkansas statute that provides for a hospital
committee of three physicians (two of whom must be psychiatrists) to make a
decision on a parental petition in what are termed "hardship cases. ' 166 The
law states that the usual procedure is to petition the courts, but the physician
panel may make the decision in the undefined category of "hardship" cases. 167
While the "hardship" caveat seems to render vacuous the idea of court juris-
diction, the notion of a hospital committee's being entrusted with the power to
approve a parental petition is not unheard of. Such committees routinely ap-
prove many matters of substance, such as the appropriateness of certain exper-
iments.1 68 The Supreme Court of New Jersey even mandated their use in
decisions on withdrawal of therapy in the celebrated Quinlan case. 169
A third set of alternatives for third-party review requires direct judicial
involvement in the decision-making process. Some of these approaches pro-
vide for administrative boards to serve as decision-making bodies, with provi-
sions for court appeal. 170 Other statutes involve direct decisions by courts,
generally probate courts charged with other matters of domestic or family re-
lationships, including guardianship. 17 1
Of these alternatives, the most reasonable is that providing for court deci-
sion making in the first instance. Administrative boards are notoriously infor-
mal in their procedures and often hold their meetings in situations that make
public access difficult. This might be particularly true when the board meets
164. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19-569g (repealed 1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 46.12 (repealed 1977).
165. See cases cited at note 14 supra.
166. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of Section I... and as an alternative to the
Probate Court directives as described in Section 1, it is recognized that obvious hardship
and environmental circumstances truly negate the protective measures intended in Sec-
tion 1.... It shall be considered not unlawful for a legal guardian ... or a parent...
to seek sterilization for their charges through direct medical channels. Before any sterili-
zation procedure will be performed... there must be filed with the approved hospital
where the sterilization is to be performed the certificate of three Doctors of
Medicine.... The certificate shall state that said Doctors have examined the woman,
child or man and certify in writing that the element of incompetence... is truly present
and that they believe a sterilization is justified.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 59-502 (1971).
167. Id. § 59-501.
168. See generally N. Hershey & R. Miller, Human Experimentation and the Law (1976).
169. In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
170. Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 5701-5705 (1974) (providing for board authorization without
appeal to the courts); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, §§ 2461-2468 (1964) (providing specific authori-
zation for appeal to the courts, but not mandating court review); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-45-1 to -
19 (1976) (same); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, §§ 341-346 (West 1936) (same); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 436.010 to .150 (1979) (same); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-47-10 to -68 (Law. Co-op 1976) (same).
171. Mandating court determination of sterilization of the retarded: Ga. Code § 84-933 (1979);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35-36 (Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-4 (1978); Va. Code §§ 54-325.10 to
-325.11 (Supp. 1981); W.Va. Code § 27-16-1 (1980).
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only infrequently. Moreover, any order of any board ought to be subject to
appeal to a court, and once in the court system, normal judicial procedures
would govern. Hence, prior review by a board may be considered superfluous.
It might be urged, however, that a hospital review committee should be
entrusted with the authority to decide sterilization petitions since such a com-
mittee will be composed of experts in the field. Their expertise could be
brought to bear on an individual case in a much more detailed fashion than is
possible by a court. Only cases of egregious error on the part of the committee
would need to be appealed to the courts. Despite its strengths, this alternative
is unattractive for the simple reason that in sterilization cases, professional
expertise, while relevant, is not determinative. Clinical expertise may be a
necessary factor for consideration by a court in deciding a case; however, this
expertise represents only one variable in reaching a decision on a sterilization
petition. At a minimum the court needs to know the concerns and desires of
the candidate. Furthermore, clinical expertise is a notoriously varying ingredi-
ent. One physician's experience may be much different from another's, espe-
cially with such a multifaceted problem as mental retardation. Trying to
specify further the precise nature of the expertise that should be represented
on these committees would be extremely difficult as a matter of codification.
A proper regard for the seriousness of the decision mandates a de novo
court decision in all sterilization cases. In light of the enormous consequences
of sterilization, there must be the strictest possible scrutiny of the proposed
operation and the supposed "compelling interests" that justify it. In our soci-
ety this scrutiny has been entrusted to the courts. It would set a dangerous
precedent if decisions of this magnitude were entrusted to a committee of
practicing professionals. Medical professionals have no expertise in ensuring
that minimum requirements of due process have been met, nor are they
uniquely skilled to evaluate the large amounts of nonclinical data that must
enter into a decision such as this. A professional committee also may not pro-
vide an open forum in which the affected candidate may express her views.
The candidate may be intimidated in such a setting, especially if her intellec-
tual capacities are moderately to severely limited. Finally, we note that the
most important procedural requirement from the candidate's point of view is
the appointment of a competent guardian ad litem. 172 This is more than just
an appointment of a "patient advocate" or representative. The guardian ad
litem must ensure procedural fairness in the initial hearing and must be pre-
pared to appeal the decision if necessary. The legal competency of the guard-
ian ad litem in ensuring such procedural fairness is not likely to be judged
better by a committee of physicians than by a court.
Vesting the ultimate decision-making authority in a court, however, does
not eliminate the need for consideration of the possible roles of both the par-
172. "A guardian ad litem is a special guardian appointed by the court to prosecute or defend
in behalf of an infant or incompetent, a suit to which he is a party, and such guardian is consid-
ered an officer of the court to represent the interests of the infant or incompetent in the litigation."
Black's Law Dictionary 635 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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ent/guardian and the candidate herself in the decision. The need to obtain
consent from a parent or guardian is obvious, as they will bear the hardships
that would follow from any pregnancy or childbirth. Moreover, the parent or
guardian can supply intimate, special knowledge of the candidate that is not
easily obtainable from other sources. If they are willing to run the risks en-
tailed by failure to sterilize, or if they believe that sterilization is unnecessary,
then they should be allowed to act on that assessment.
Although this requirement of obtaining consent from the legal guardian
of the candidate is fairly obvious, a more difficult policy question concerns
those retarded individuals who are not under legal guardianship. Should
guardian consent be uniformly required, or should it be held to apply only to
those currently under guardianship? On balance, the best alternative is to re-
quire consent of a parent or guardian in all cases. Parents do, and guardians
may, have special knowledge concerning the lives of those in their care. This
knowledge very often will be highly significant in rendering intelligent deci-
sions regarding sterilization. Moreover, this sort of information is not likely to
be duplicated by knowledge obtainable from the various social agencies in-
volved with a candidate. Furthermore, if a guardian has not been appointed
for a noninstitutionalized retarded person, a presumption of competence must
follow. To allow state agencies to present a noninstitutionalized candidate to
the court reverses the presumption of competence. This reversal could set a
dangerous precedent, leading to abuses of other retarded persons and their
rights.
The emerging doctrine of limited guardianship1 73 provides courts and
policy makers with an appropriate vehicle for requiring third-party consent for
sterilization, while allowing the widest possible liberty to the candidate. For
those persons incapable of understanding adequately the implications of steril-
ization and perhaps other activities with long-term consequences, a properly
designed, limited guardianship order should preserve the freedom of the per-
son as much as possible and yet prevent her from harming herself or others
through her incompetence. 174
The situation of institutionalized persons presents a special case. Their
institutionalization may create a presumption of incompetence, but that is only
a presumption and is not universally valid. 175 Before court authorization for
sterilization could be obtained, the incompetence of the candidate would need
173. Under the concept of limited guardianship, an incompetent is allowed to exercise all
rights other than those specific rights that he is deemed incapable of managing. See Hodgson,
Guardianship of Mentally Retarded Persons: Three Approaches to a Long Neglected Problem, 37
Albany L. Rev. 407 (1973).
174. On limited guardianship, see id. See also the Model Guardianship Act drafted by the
Mental Health Law Project of the National Institute of Mental Health, 2 Mental Disability Law
Reporter (ABA) 441, 449 (1978).
175. At law a competency hearing is not the same as a commitment hearing, and the recom-
mendation of most experts is that the hearings should be kept separate since they concern them-
selves with distinct issues. See R. Allen, E. Ferster & H. Weihofen, Mental Impairment and Legal
Incompetency (1968); Am. Bar Ass'n, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (S. Brakel & R. Rock
eds. 1972). For examples of seemingly competent comments by retarded persons on this matter,
see Sabagh & Edgerton, note 161 supra. Also see text accompanying note 177 infra.
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to be demonstrated. For cases necessitating third party authorization, concur-
rence of the guardian or parent should be obtained. This position is favored
because of the specially coercive setting of the institution and the need to en-
sure that the candidate has the benefit of advice from someone outside the
institution who is charged specifically with the responsibility for her welfare.
It is probable that a parent or guardian will not have as detailed a picture of
the institutionalized candidate as will the institutional staff. Nevertheless, the
staff itself may have other concerns, such as cofivenience or the welfare of the
institutional arrangement, that may not be congruent with the interests of the
candidate. While courts can screen institutional requests for sterilization and
reject those that do not meet the interests of the candidate, courts cannot con-
cern themselves as intimately with the welfare of a specific candidate as can a
parent or a guardian. Therefore, parents and guardians who have this rela-
tionship of special care should be brought into the decision-making process. If
these persons fail to give consent when it is warranted for therapeutic or hy-
gienic reasons, recourse can always be had to the courts, as a substantial line
of cases suggests. 176
V. THE ROLE OF THE CANDIDATE
The most difficult problem of consent for sterilization concerns the appro-
priate role for the candidate in the decision-making process. This is a compli-
cated and not easily resolved issue because retardation is not a uniform or
specific set of disabilities. It is a many-faceted problem that involves a great
range of abilities and behaviors among those affected. Especially at the higher
I.Q. end of the retardation spectrum, one might find individuals labeled re-
tarded who are capable of understanding the significance of sterilization and
who can voice informed opinions on the matter. In an excellent study, Sabagh
and Edgerton found many examples of lucid, precise comments on steriliza-
tion from persons who had been sterilized in state institutions. 177 When indi-
viduals can offer such comments and can understand the meaning of
sterilization for themselves, we see no reason to deem them incompetent to
make the decision for themselves.
The most difficult choices must be made concerning those persons who do
not appear to understand the significance of sterilization but who may be able
to voice objections to it. Should we consider the comments of a retarded per-
son in making the decision, especially when he is not competent to make a
decision for himsel? Should a hostile response from the candidate be deter-
minative? As to the first question, the candidate certainly should be heard on
the matter. To allow otherwise would be a gross denial of due process. 178
176. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 66-67 supra.
177. Sabagh & Edgerton, note 161 supra.
178. "Due process of law means that every person must have his day in court.... " Davis v.
Berry, 216 F. 413,418 (D. Iowa 1914) (holding unconstitutional Iowa's eugenic sterilization law on
due process grounds). See also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383, 1385 (M.D. Ala. 1974)(developing guidelines for sterilizing residents of Alabama institutions and requiring discussion
with the patient).
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However, on the second question, a negative or hostile response from a candi-
date should not preclude sterilization if a "last resort" test, as outlined above,
has been met.
A person judged incompetent to give a full, informed consent to steriliza-
tion may have inaccurate information about sterilization or she may have un-
justified fears about sterilization. However onerous it may be to sterilize
someone over his objections, to do otherwise may be a graver injustice. If
sterilization has met the stringent last resort test proposed herein, then it can
be said to be in the best interests of that retarded individual to be sterilized. If
this is so, then it is simply irresponsible to allow the retardate's unjustified
fears or inability to understand the nature of sterilization to prevent a steriliza-
tion that, on balance, is for the candidate's and society's benefit.
Unwilling sterilization of incompetents is likely to be a rare occurrence,
for several reasons. First, many supposedly retarded persons may be able to
understand and agree with sterilization if it is explained to them properly.179
Second, when a candidate voices objections, sterilization may be more likely
to do harm than good and a last-resort test would not be met. As noted above,
there is a significant correlation between mental retardation and emotional
disturbance.' 80 This correlation suggests that sterilizing such a person over
her objections, irrespective of how irrational she may be, simply may increase
her disturbance, further lower already precarious self-image and hinder the
retardate's development in general. These possibilities should be carefully
considered before sterilization is performed.
The AAMD statement' 81 and the model sterilization act drafted by the
Association for Voluntary Sterilization (AVS)182 propose a unique approach
requiring court review for those persons who have not been judged incompe-
tent but whose competence may be questioned with respect to the decision
whether he or she should be sterilized. Such a law was in force in Montana 83
and met with favorable comment from some physicians in that state.' 84 None-
theless, there are extreme difficulties with such a law. In the first place it is
very difficult to state in a manner that is not either subject to abuse or hope-
lessly vague who should be covered by such a law. The Montana law pro-
vided for court review for all those "who, under appropriate standards would
be diagnosed as capable of consent to sterilization but whose capacity to con-
sent has been questioned by a licensed physician."'1 5 If the purpose of the law
is to provide for sterilization for that class of "borderline" individuals who
could benefit from involuntary sterilization procedures, the above formulation
179. Meyerowitz, supra note 137, at 108.
180. See text accompanying notes 156-57 supra.
181. See note 32 supra.
182. The AVS bill appears in Neuwirth, Heisler & Goldrich, Capacity, Competence, Consent:
Voluntary Sterilization of the Retarded, 6 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 447 (1974).
183. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 53-23-101 to -105 (1979) (originally § 69-6401) (repealed 1981).
184. For favorable comment on the Montana law, see Pallister & Perry, Reflections on Mar-
riage for the Retarded. The Case for Voluntary Sterilization, 24 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry
172 (1973).
185. Mont. Code Ann. § 53-23-102 (1979) (repealed 1981).
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will not satisfy this intent. Many such borderline individuals may present
themselves to physicians so as not to call their competency into question. The
same or similar individuals presenting themselves to different physicians
might produce different results. Thus, many individuals that could benefit
from sterilization will pass unnoticed. The statute simply fails to provide
enough breadth to apply reasonably to all those individuals it supposedly is
designed to help.
The reverse criticism can be made of the AVS model bill. It provides for
court review in all cases in which a person's competency either has been chal-
lenged or "might be challenged" by a licensed physician.186 The "might be
challenged provision" is inherently vague and impossible to apply with any
consistency. Its ambiguity creates the potential for cutting too deeply into the
class of individuals presumed to be competent to manage their own affairs.
Aside from their hopelessly vague nature, the standards in the AVS,
AAMD and Montana statutes are both dangerous and unnecessary. Court
proceedings such as envisaged therein could provide a basis for a later claim
that the candidate was legally incompetent for purposes other than deciding
whether sterilization is proper. Although such a judgment certainly would be
based on more than the sterilization hearing alone, the suspicions of a physi-
cian in a sterilization hearing should not be used as a foundation for a far-
reaching and possibly erroneous judgment of legal incompetency. Moreover,
existing tort remedies render unnecessary such a "separate treatment" for
some legally competent persons. If a physician acts without the informed con-
sent of the patient in sterilizing a competent individual, he is subject to a
number of different legal penalties, primarily malpractice suits. These reme-
dies, while not perfect, are at least as adequate as those envisioned above but
do not have the defect of subjecting a subclass of presumably competent per-
sons to a court proceeding to determine, not its members' total incompetency,
but rather their capacity to consent to one medical procedure. Such a subclass
could be expanded almost indefinitely, with potentially serious and unwar-
ranted consequences.
VI. CONCLUSION
State laws providing for the sterilization of mentally retarded persons in
the United States are, for the most part, woefully inadequate and are premised
upon eugenic concepts long since discarded by medical and genetics profes-
sionals. These laws, products of the early twentieth century, were built upon
the need to prevent passage of "defective genes" to future generations. More
recently, they have been based upon the perceived state interest in preventing
procreation of children by individuals totally incapable of providing for suste-
nance and care of their children. Existing laws, however, fail to further this
interest in a substantive and procedural context that will protect the retarded
person's fundamental right to procreate yet simultaneously permit sterilization
186. Neuwirth, Heisler & Goldrich, note 182 supra, at 465.
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in compelling cases and prohibit the abuses that often have attended steriliza-
tion of the retarded.
This Article has proposed a procedural and substantive framework to
achieve these goals. In summary, the authors have proposed a procedure hav-
ing the following components:
1. Initiators of a Sterilization: Parents, guardians and institutions may
propose sterilization in appropriate cases, but such proposals shall not
be determinative.
2. Candidatefor Sterilization: A person who, by reason of mental defect
or retardation, is permanently incapable of understanding the nature
of the sterilization operation and its effects, or of rationally con-
senting or withholding consent to the operation. If a person labelled
"retarded" is capable of understanding and evaluating the operation,
the person's decision is determinative and no further attempt to steril-
ize may be made.
3. Forum for Determination: A court of competent, trial-level jurisdic-
tion, by de novo hearing, with no preceding administrative hearing or
review.
4. Role of Parents/Guardians: In all cases the consent of the parents or
legal guardians must be obtained. If a retarded person is not a minor
or has not been placed under guardianship, he shall be presumed to
be competent and his wishes shall be determinative.
5. Standardfor Court Review: If the candidate meets the foregoing crite-
ria for a court to "substitute judgment" for the sterilization, the court
may authorize the operation, only if all of the following criteria are
met:
(a) Sterilization must be in the best interests of the candidate, irre-
spective of the interests of the parents or guardians.
(b) Sterilization must be the least restrictive alternative usable to
solve the problem and still meet the state's interest, as measured
by the following factors:
(1) There must be total certainty that the candidate's ,perma-
nent and irremediable retardation precludes any possibility
of future capacity to care adequately for children;
(2) The candidate must have present capacity to reproduce;
(3) The candidate must be sexually active;
(4) Other methods of contraception must be impractical or un-
workable; and
(5) Sterilization must be the least harmful alternative to
reproduction.
In 1980, the Washington Supreme Court handed dowii an important rul-
ing directly concerning the issues treated in this Article. In In re Hays,18 7 the
187. 93 Wash. 228, 231-34, 608 P.2d 635, 637-39 (1980).
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court held as a matter of law that the superior courts of the state have the
power to issue sterilization orders on the petition of a parent and in the ab-
sence of any state statute expressly authorizing the issuance of such an order.
As a matter of policy it further ordered the superior courts to follow a detailed
procedure for reviewing such cases,188 which largely mirrors the one worked
out in sections three, four and five of this Article.
The Washington court held that several cases from other state appellate
courts holding to the contrary were not controlling, because they merely ex-
pressed opinions and offered no substantive principle of law to support their
deference to legislative initiative.189 This argument may not be as persuasive
as it appears. As the divided opinions on this question suggest, it is at least
debatable whether or not courts have, or should have, the power to invade
summarily the fundamental rights of citizens without express legislative or
constitutional authorization to do so, especially when, as here, such an inva-
sion possibly will result in the irremediable elimination of the power to exer-
cise a fundamental right.
Aside from this point, the policy adopted by the court for consideration of
such petitions is wholly commendable and represents a major advance in judi-
cial consideration of this matter. Procedurally, the court requires that the in-
competent individual be represented by counsel, that his views be heard and
taken into account, and that the court be afforded expert evaluations of the
physical, mental and social state of the candidate.190 Substantively, it requires
that
[t]he judge must find that the individual is 1) physically capable
of procreation, 2) likely to engage in sexual activity at present or in
the near future in circumstances likely to result in pregnancy and
must find in addition that 3) the nature and extent of the individual's
disability... renders him or her permanently incapable of caring
for a child even with reasonable assistance .... Finally, there must
be no alternatives to sterilization.19'
This policy is entirely reasonable and is consistent with that developed in
this Article. Unlike this Article, however, the Washington court offers no reso-
lution to the difficult equal protection problems caused by its third require-
ment, nor does it offer a detailed rationale for its specific requirements.
Nevertheless, as an outline the policy is laudable.
A word must be added about the standard of review to be applied by the
court in its fact-finding efforts. Various statutes establish burdens of proof
ranging from mere preponderance of the evidence 192 to a "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" standard. 93 Most statutes provide no standard whatsoever.' 94
188. Id. at 237-40, 608 P.2d at 640-42.
189. Id. at 231, 608 P.2d at 637.
190. Id. at 238, 608 P.2d at 641.
191. Id.
192. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 84-933(c)(iv)(1979).
193. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat Ann. § 4 5-7 8y(6) (West 1981); Va. Code § 54-325.12.A (Supp.
1981).
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To adequately protect the candidate's right to procreate, it may be appropriate
to require a criminal-law burden of proof: "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Perhaps the most difficult task facing the judicial system is to make deci-
sions in those ever-increasing areas in which the law has little expertise and
which represent problems in human relations surrounding fundamental rights.
Indeed, in these cases more than others, "hard cases make bad law." However,
by the development of clear and concise standards such as those proposed in
this Article, in one area of legal involvement in human relationships-sterili-
zation of the mentally retarded--the hard cases may no longer make bad, un-
workable or inhumane law. Although the wisdom of Solomon cannot be
created legislatively, the proposed standards may provide a humane and just
resolution of the most compelling cases for sterilization, yet protect the men-
tally retarded from the abuses that have occurred in the past.
194. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann.§ 59-502(k) (1971); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43A, §343 (West 1979); S.C.
Code Ann. § 44-47-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976); W. Va. Code § 27-16-1 (1980).
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